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ABSTRACT—For decades, it was virtually impossible for a criminal
defendant to challenge racial discrimination by the police or prosecutors.
This was because in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), the
Supreme Court set an insurmountable standard for obtaining discovery in
support of a selective prosecution claim. Equating the roles of prosecutors
and law enforcement officers, lower courts applied this same standard to
claims alleging racial discrimination by the police. This high standard led
courts to deny discovery and stifle potentially meritorious claims. Recently,
criminal defendants have initiated a wave of challenges to “fake stash house”
operations, in which federal law enforcement agencies like the ATF and the
DEA approach people—overwhelmingly people of color—and induce them
to rob a nonexistent drug stash house. Defense attorneys have argued that
these practices constitute racially selective law enforcement and that
Armstrong’s strict standard should not apply to the police. Three federal
courts of appeals responded by recognizing that the differences between
prosecutors and law enforcement officers merit lowering the discovery
standard for defendants alleging racial discrimination by the police. This
Article is the first to describe and defend this important development in equal
protection jurisprudence. We argue that other courts should similarly craft a
lower discovery standard.
Recognizing that federal courts hear only a fraction of race
discrimination claims, this Article embraces the spirit of federalism and
proposes an innovative state-level solution: a state court rule lowering the
insuperable discovery standard to which most states still cling. This Article
draws on a recent Washington state court rule aimed at preventing racial
discrimination in jury selection to propose that state courts adopt a similar
rule setting a new discovery standard for racially selective law enforcement
claims. Such a rule would ensure that state-level equal protection claims are
not blocked at the discovery stage, thus enabling courts to adjudicate those
claims on the merits.
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INTRODUCTION
Soon after Leslie Mayfield moved to the Chicago suburbs to escape the
violence of the city and got a job at LG Electronics, a coworker mounted a
campaign to rope him into robbing a drug stash house containing over a
million dollars’ worth of drugs.1 Little did Leslie know that the man nagging
him to commit a crime was an informant for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
1
See United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Criminal Complaint at
2, United States v. Mayfield, No. 09-CR-0687 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2009), 2009 WL 10652986 (“The
[criminal informant] further told Mayfield . . . that the home invasion could net approximately fifteen or
more kilograms of cocaine.”); Sentencing Memorandum & Position Paper on Supervised Release
Conditions at 24, United States v. Mayfield, No. 15-CR-0497 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2018), ECF No. 151
(stating that the average wholesale price of cocaine was $83.43 per gram at the time).
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Firearms and Explosives (ATF). For a time, Leslie was able to resist the
informant’s overtures. But after Leslie took a loan from the informant to fix
his broken-down car, Leslie felt he had little choice but to commit the
robbery to repay the debt.2
The informant then brought in an undercover ATF agent who told
Leslie that he was a disgruntled drug courier seeking to rob his employers of
their drugs. He laid out a get-rich-quick robbery scheme, claiming that the
stash house would be patrolled by armed guards to encourage Leslie to bring
others along and arm himself. When Leslie showed up with his brother,
cousin, and a friend, they learned it was all fake—there were no drugs, no
armed guards; even the house was a pure figment. 3 All four men were
charged, convicted, and received sentences ranging from twenty-two to
twenty-seven years in federal prison.4
Leslie was arrested as part of what is commonly known as a “fake stash
house operation.” Every fake stash house operation follows the same basic
playbook: an informant working for the ATF or the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) approaches someone like Leslie—a person of color in dire
financial straits—offers him an enticing jackpot, and then introduces the
target to an undercover agent who describes a heavily guarded house to
induce him to bring along friends and guns.5 Federal prosecutors and agents
intentionally set a fictional drug amount that will trigger a high mandatory
penalty, while the inducement to bring guns triggers an additional and
2

Mayfield, 771 F.3d at 422–23.
Id. at 423; Annie Sweeney & Jason Meisner, Convicted in a Controversial Stash House Sting
Operation, Leslie Mayfield Is Struggling to Rebuild His Life After Prison, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 7, 2019, 6:42
AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-justice/ct-drug-stash-house-sting-20190930-5p7u
iawtybesrgd5h6kx5wznoy-story.html [https://perma.cc/EX9A-PVRP].
4
See Sentencing Order, Mayfield, No. 09-CR-0687, ECF No. 283 (originally sentencing Mayfield to
322 months in prison); Sentencing Order, Mayfield, No. 09-CR-0687, ECF No. 224 (sentencing defendant
Ward to 270 months); Sentencing Order, Mayfield, No. 09-CR-0687, ECF No. 225 (sentencing defendant
Kindle to 300 months); Sentencing Order, Mayfield, No. 09-CR-0687, ECF No. 265 (sentencing
defendant White to 300 months). The government ultimately dismissed the mandatory minimums in
Mayfield’s case, and he was resentenced and released after serving 114 months in prison. See Sentencing
Order, Mayfield, No. 15-CR-0497 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 2018), ECF No. 160; see also Jason Meisner, Under
Pressure by Judges, Prosecutors to Offer Plea Deals in Controversial Drug Stash House Cases, CHI.
TRIB. (Feb. 21, 2018, 4:55 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-atf-stash-houseprosecutions-20180221-story.html [https://perma.cc/D28S-9PN6] (describing the racial disparity among
stash house sting operation targets as “so large that there was ‘a zero percent likelihood’ it happened by
chance”).
5
United States v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401, 404 (7th Cir. 2012) (observing that the ATF “has a standard
playbook” for its stash house operations and “the facts between cases are frequently nearly identical”);
Eda Katharine Tinto, Undercover Policing, Overstated Culpability, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1446–47
(2013) (“[B]ecause the stash house is entirely imaginary, the police invent other critical details that help
entice the suspects . . . .”).
3
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consecutive mandatory penalty. As a result, defendants typically face a
mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years in prison. 6
When the targets gather to execute the law enforcement-led “robbery,”
federal agents arrest them, charging them with conspiracy to commit
robbery, conspiracy to distribute narcotics, and gun possession. 7 These
operations have more than quadrupled since 2004.8
Nationwide, federal law enforcement agencies have overwhelmingly
targeted people of color to commit these fabricated crimes. In Chicago, from
2011 to 2013, only one individual out of the fifty-seven charged by the ATF
in a stash house operation was white.9 In the past decade of stash house cases
in New York, none of the 179 defendants charged were white. 10 In Los
Angeles, one agent testified that fifty-five out of sixty stash house defendants
indicted were people of color.11 A 2014 review by USA Today of stash house
cases nationwide found that “[a]t least 91% of the people agents have locked
up using those [stash house] stings were racial or ethnic minorities.” 12 In
6
See United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 224 (3d Cir. 2017) (McKee, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“Although no cocaine actually existed, the Government decided to entice targeted
individuals with a predetermined quantity of cocaine—10 kilograms—which was double the amount
needed to statutorily trigger the mandatory minimum provisions.”); United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93,
103–04 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[A] stash house sting entails considerable government involvement—including
direct solicitation of the target and total control over the parameters of the robbery, particularly the
quantity of cocaine held in the fictitious stash house—and appears highly susceptible to abuse.”); United
States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he government has virtually unfettered ability to
inflate the amount of drugs supposedly in the house and thereby obtain a greater sentence for the
defendant.”); United States v. Caban, 173 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It is unsettling that in this type of
reverse sting, the government has a greater than usual ability to influence a defendant’s ultimate
Guidelines level and sentence. . . . [T]he difference in offense levels between 49.9 kilograms and 50
kilograms under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 potentially could entail as much as 78 months of incremental
imprisonment.”).
7
Tinto, supra note 5, at 1447.
8
Brad Heath, Investigation: ATF Drug Stings Targeted Minorities, USA TODAY (Apr. 24, 2019,
11:50 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/07/20/atf-stash-house-stings-racialprofiling/12800195/ [https://perma.cc/WUA5-8AL8].
9
Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 15, United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976 (N.D. Ill. 2018)
(No.
12-CR-0632-RC),
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/report_of_jeffrey_fagan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y78Q-RZT7].
10
Shayna Jacobs, 10 Years. 179 Arrests. No White Defendants. DEA Tactics Face Scrutiny in New
York., WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2019, 8:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/10years-179-arrests-no-white-defendants-dea-tactics-face-scrutiny-in-new-york/2019/12/14/f6462242-12
ce-11ea-bf62-eadd5d11f559_story.html [https://perma.cc/7RA2-Q4XY].
11
Maura Dolan, U.S. Appeals Court Expresses Concern About Sting Operations that
Overwhelmingly Target Blacks and Latinos, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018, 4:10 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-sting-9th-circuit-20181015-story.html
[https://perma.cc/XXE7-RK7F].
12
Heath, supra note 8 (identifying 635 stash house defendants nationwide from 2004 to 2014 and
finding 579 were people of color).
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response to these disparities, defense attorneys across the country are
mounting equal protection challenges, alleging race discrimination by
federal law enforcement officers.13
For decades, it was virtually impossible to hold the police accountable
for race discrimination. Historically, the legal standards to do so were so
difficult to meet that Professor Michelle Alexander predicted that “[t]he
racial profiling cases that swept the nation in the 1990s may well be the last
wave of litigation challenging racial bias in the criminal justice system that
we see for a very long time.”14
Under the Equal Protection Clause,15 criminal defendants can object to
discriminatory enforcement of the law using two mechanisms: selective
prosecution claims and selective law enforcement claims. “‘Prosecution’
refers to the actions of prosecutors . . . and ‘enforcement’ to the actions of
law enforcement and those affiliated with law-enforcement personnel.”16 A
criminal defendant who is charged with a crime can move for dismissal of
the indictment, arguing that either the prosecutor, law enforcement officers,
or both violated his equal protection rights by impermissibly singling him
out on the basis of race.17
The Supreme Court created an insuperable discovery standard for
selective prosecution claims in United States v. Armstrong. 18 In practice,
Armstrong’s discovery standard creates an abstract right without a remedy.19
13
See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 991–93 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (alleging an ATF
reverse-sting stash house operation constituted racially selective law enforcement); United States v.
Lopez, 415 F. Supp. 3d 422, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (alleging a DEA reverse-sting stash house operation
constituted racially selective law enforcement).
14
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 138–39 (2d ed. 2012); see also id. at 109 (“[T]he Supreme Court has made it virtually
impossible to challenge racial bias in the criminal justice system under the Fourteenth Amendment, and
it has barred litigation of such claims under federal civil rights laws as well.”).
15
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. These protections apply to the federal government as well. See
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 n.9 (1985) (noting that the Fifth Amendment imposes the same
restraints on the government’s exercise of enforcement discretion as the Fourteenth Amendment). Thus,
on the federal level, these challenges are brought through the Due Process Clause’s equal protection
component.
16
United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 214 (3d Cir. 2017); see also United States v. GarciaPena, No. 17-CR-363-GBD, 2018 WL 6985220, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) (“A selective prosecution
claim is . . . an . . . assertion that the prosecutor has brought a charge for reasons forbidden by the
Constitution. By contrast, a selective enforcement claim is directed solely at police or agent misconduct.”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)).
17
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (dismissing indictment based on selective
prosecution); United States v. Mumphrey, 193 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that
“dismissal of an indictment is a proper remedy for a selective enforcement claim if proven”).
18
517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996).
19
Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1139 (2000).
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Broadly speaking, to get discovery, a defendant must present “some
evidence” tending to show both discriminatory effect and discriminatory
intent.20 First, the discriminatory-effect prong requires a defendant to make
a “credible showing of different treatment of similarly situated persons” of
another race by the prosecution. 21 However, gathering evidence that
individuals of a different race were committing the same offense but were
not charged is a near impossible task.22 Second, a defendant must initially
present “some evidence” of discriminatory intent on the part of
prosecutors23—evidence that will be unobtainable without discovery and that
prosecutors have every incentive to keep secret. Thus, the defendant is
confronted with Armstrong’s cruel catch-22: he must provide evidence of
discrimination to obtain discovery about discrimination.
For many years, courts amplified Armstrong’s catch-22 by improperly
affording law enforcement officers the same blind deference that Armstrong
afforded prosecutors. Although Armstrong was a selective prosecution case,
courts have extended Armstrong’s insurmountable standard to selective law
enforcement claims alleging that law enforcement officers discriminated on
the basis of race.24
As difficult as it is to meet Armstrong’s similarly situated standard in
the selective prosecution context, it is still harder to meet in the selective law
enforcement context for two reasons. First, it is impossible for a person of
color to point to similarly situated white individuals who were not arrested
because there is no record of such people. Second, without discovery, a
defendant cannot know what led the police to target him, so he cannot know
who is “similarly situated” to him.
In the stash house context, three federal courts of appeals recently held
that Armstrong should not apply to selective law enforcement claims and
accordingly lowered the discovery standard. The Seventh Circuit first
distinguished selective prosecution claims from selective law enforcement
claims in United States v. Davis.25 The Third and Ninth Circuits then built on
20

Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470.
Id.; see also Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1905) (holding that defendants alleging
selective prosecution must provide evidence of a similarly situated individual of a different race who was
not prosecuted but could have been).
22
See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong,
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 606 (1998) (“[T]he ‘similarly situated’ requirement renders many meritorious
claims impossible to prove.”).
23
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468.
24
See infra Section II.A.
25
See 793 F.3d 712, 721 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Professor Siegler and her Federal Criminal Justice
Clinic litigated the defense appeal in Davis.
21
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that distinction by eliminating both the granular similarly situated
requirement and the discriminatory-intent requirement. 26 These three
decisions created a circuit split, as some circuits still apply the Armstrong
standard to selective law enforcement claims.27
This Article is the first to analyze this new wave of challenges to
racially selective law enforcement and the developments in equal protection
jurisprudence it has generated. We argue that the path charted by Davis
correctly recognizes that Armstrong is inapplicable in the selective law
enforcement context and urge other courts to follow suit. A lower standard
will enable criminal defendants to obtain discovery and litigate selective law
enforcement challenges on the merits, a rarity in the decades since
Armstrong.
Although the recent courts of appeals cases allow legitimate claims of
race discrimination by the police to survive the discovery stage in many
federal courthouses, federal courts hear only a small percentage of criminal
cases nationwide, exposing them to only a fraction of such claims. Too many
reforms proposed by scholars neglect our system of dual constitutionalism
where both federal and state constitutions protect individual rights. This
Article argues that state courts should likewise adopt a lower discovery
standard for racially selective law enforcement claims.
Building on the recent federal cases, this Article proposes a new
discovery rule that state supreme courts could enact to authorize discovery
regarding racial discrimination by law enforcement and thus ensure that
meritorious equal protection claims against the police are not blocked at the
discovery stage. Our proposed rule draws on a Washington state court rule
aimed at preventing race discrimination in jury selection.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I traces the history of the merits
standard for equal protection claims challenging race discrimination in
criminal cases. It then critiques Armstrong’s insurmountable discovery
standard for selective prosecution claims.
Part II explains how, although Armstrong was a selective prosecution
case, courts have applied its discovery standard to equal protection claims
against law enforcement officers. Part II then details how the Third, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits have recognized that the two types of claims should be
treated differently and have departed from Armstrong’s framework, creating
26

See United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 220–21 (3d Cir. 2017); United States v. Sellers,
906 F.3d 848, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2018).
27
See United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 100 (4th Cir. 2016); see also Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 818 (6th
Cir. 2005) (applying Armstrong in the civil context); Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir.
2003) (same).
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a lower discovery standard for racially selective law enforcement claims. It
argues that those courts were correct to depart from Armstrong for three
reasons. First, as a doctrinal matter, the police do not enjoy the same
deference as prosecutors. Second, as a practical matter, Armstrong’s
requirements are unworkable in the law enforcement context. Third, a lower
discovery standard is the only way judges can adjudicate claims of race
discrimination by the police on the merits. Part II concludes that other courts
should follow suit and abandon Armstrong’s discovery standard in the
policing context.
Part III recognizes that federal solutions to race discrimination by law
enforcement can have only a limited impact, and that state courts regularly
apply Armstrong’s high discovery standard to both selective prosecution and
selective law enforcement claims. It then explores a growing body of state
court rules, laws, and constitutional provisions that are more protective of
criminal defendants’ rights than the current constitutional standards.
Part IV identifies a novel avenue for reform: state court rules.
Embracing the spirit of federalism, we draw on a recent Washington state
court rule aimed at preventing racial discrimination in jury selection to
propose that other state courts adopt a similar rule setting a new discovery
standard for racially selective law enforcement claims.
I.

RACIALLY SELECTIVE PROSECUTION CLAIMS

Former United States Attorney General and Supreme Court Justice
Robert H. Jackson remarked that “[t]he prosecutor has more control over life,
liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.”28 Justice Jackson
explained that the prosecutor’s power to choose his defendants also gives
him the power to pick “some person whom he dislikes or desires to
embarrass, or select[] some group of unpopular persons and then look[] for
an offense.” 29 This ability to selectively target individuals or groups of
individuals is where “the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power
lies.”30

28
Robert H. Jackson, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the Second
Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18, 18
(1940).
29
Id. at 19.
30
Id.; see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (“[T]he breadth of discretion that
our country’s legal system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the potential for both individual
and institutional abuse.”).
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Even so, “although prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not
‘unfettered.’” 31 The Equal Protection Clause is one such limit, prohibiting
enforcement that is “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such
as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”32 This limit flows from the
Supreme Court’s recognition that the government’s “obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all.”33
This Part chronicles the development of the constitutional constraints
on prosecutors by describing the foundations of selective prosecution claims,
that is, equal protection claims brought against prosecutors. Section I.A
tracks the development of the merits standard for selective prosecution
claims under the Equal Protection Clause. Section I.B critiques the standard
that defendants must meet to gain discovery from a prosecutor’s office on
such a claim, which was laid out in United States v. Armstrong. It explains
how the Armstrong standard has proven insurmountable in practice—no
defendant has met the merits standard for selective prosecution since the
nineteenth century, and few have even obtained discovery.
A. Pre-Armstrong Cases
The landmark civil rights case Yick Wo v. Hopkins was the first—and
to date only—successful selective prosecution action sustained by the
Supreme Court.34 In that case, a Chinese national, Lee Yick, challenged the
enforcement of a San Francisco municipal ordinance regulating the licensing
of laundries.35 The ordinance gave the city’s board of supervisors the power
to grant or deny laundry licenses.36 Yick, despite “hav[ing] complied with
every requisite, deemed by the law or by the public officers charged with its
administration,” was denied a license and subsequently prosecuted for
operating without a license.37 In his defense, Yick argued that he was singled
out for prosecution because of his race, a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. He pointed to the undisputed fact that the board had granted eighty
white individuals permission to operate laundries, while two hundred other
people of Chinese descent had been denied such permission.38

31
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S.
114, 125 (1979)).
32
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
33
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
34
118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
35
Id. at 357–58.
36
Id. at 366.
37
Id. at 374.
38
Id.

995

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

The Court recognized that, on its face, the law was neutral.39 But the
Court went on to evaluate the administrators’ intent in enforcing the law,
concluding that the racial disparity in enforcement was “so unequal and
oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of that equal
protection of the laws which is secured to the petitioners.”40 Missing from
Yick Wo, however, was a clear articulation of a merits standard for selective
prosecution claims. While denying two hundred licenses to Chinese
individuals and granting those same licenses to white individuals might seem
like an easy case, the Court did not devise a standard to guide future cases.
Nineteen years later, in Ah Sin v. Wittman, the Court laid out the first
doctrinal requirement of a selective prosecution claim: a defendant must
provide evidence of a similarly situated individual of a different race who
was not prosecuted but could have been.41 In Ah Sin, the defendant alleged
that a San Francisco County ordinance prohibiting gambling inside one’s
home was enforced solely against Chinese residents.42 The Court rejected his
selective prosecution claim, however, because he did not allege “that the
conditions and practices to which the ordinance was directed did not exist
exclusively among the Chinese.” 43 The Court wanted Ah Sin to point to
instances of secretive gambling by non-Chinese individuals who were not
prosecuted. However, the ordinance prohibited individuals from exhibiting
gambling tables in rooms barricaded from police.44 It would have been nearly
impossible for Ah Sin to collect evidence to meet the similarly situated
requirement without trespassing. As the facts of Ah Sin demonstrate, the
similarly situated requirement is daunting. And this prong is just the start of
the difficult merits standard defendants face when asserting selective
prosecution claims.
For almost seventy years, there was little change in the Court’s selective
prosecution jurisprudence. Then, in 1976, the Court decided the landmark
case Washington v. Davis. In that case, the Court clarified that to state an
equal protection violation a “discriminatory racial purpose” must be shown.45
Ten years later, in Wayte v. United States, the Court pronounced a two-prong
merits standard for selective prosecution claims.46 David Wayte was indicted
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
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Id. at 373–74.
Id. at 373.
198 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1905).
Id. at 504.
Id. at 507–08.
See id. at 503.
426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976). Discriminatory purpose is also known as discriminatory intent.
See 470 U.S. 598, 608–09, 608 n.10 (1985).
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for refusing to register for the Selective Service.47 Wayte moved to dismiss
the indictment on the ground of selective prosecution, arguing that he and
other vocal opponents of the registration program were prosecuted while
many less vocal nonregistrants were not.48
The Wayte Court began its analysis by noting that “courts [are] properly
hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute” based on a variety of
factors. 49 The Court explained its rationale for insulating prosecutorial
decisions from review:
[T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such
factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value,
the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the
Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind
of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial supervision in this
area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the
basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law
enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to
outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing
the Government’s enforcement policy.50

To protect prosecutorial discretion from scrutiny, the Court laid out a
rigorous standard: an individual challenging prosecutorial decisions on equal
protection grounds must “show both that the passive enforcement policy had
a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose,” also known as discriminatory intent.51 Applying these principles,
the Court held that Wayte failed on both grounds. Regarding discriminatory
effect, the prosecutions “did not subject vocal nonregistrants to any special
burden.”52 Regarding discriminatory purpose, Wayte had not established that
“the Government prosecuted him because of his protest activities.”53
*

*

*

Wayte thus settled the merits standard for selective prosecution claims:
defendants must show discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. In
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id. at 603.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 607–08.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 608 (emphasis added).
Id. at 610.
Id.
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addition, as a part of the discriminatory-effect prong, defendants must point
to similarly situated individuals who were not prosecuted, even if the conduct
at issue is entirely private and unobservable. 54 Obtaining evidence of
similarly situated persons, much less evidence of discriminatory intent, is
near impossible without discovery of a prosecutor’s records.55 As a result,
the standard defendants must meet to gain discovery for selective
prosecution claims makes all the difference. The Court set that standard in
United States v. Armstrong.56
B. United States v. Armstrong: An Insurmountable Barrier
United States v. Armstrong was decided in 1996, right in the middle of
the federal government’s War on Drugs.57 The case began in 1992, when a
task force of ATF and local police officers raided a hotel room occupied by
Christopher Armstrong and four others and discovered crack cocaine.58 The
five were subsequently charged federally with conspiracy to distribute more
than fifty grams of cocaine.59
The federal public defenders assigned to represent Armstrong noticed a
disturbing trend—all twenty-four of the defendants their office had
represented in crack cases during 1991 were Black.60 As a result, Armstrong
asserted a selective prosecution claim, arguing that he and his codefendants
were selected for federal prosecution, rather than state prosecution, because
of their race.61 In support of a motion requesting discovery on this claim, the
attorneys filed an affidavit attesting to this trend of federal crack
prosecutions against people of color.62

54
Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1905). Because individually identifiable arrest records
are not public, it is extremely difficult to determine the names and races of people who were arrested for
the same offense but not ultimately prosecuted.
55
See infra notes 89–92, 96.
56
517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996).
57
JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 17
(2017) (“It is now widely recognized that the drug war has caused tremendous damage—especially in the
low-income African American communities that have been its primary target.”); id. at 164 (“[T]he
[federal drug] law’s harsher treatment of crack defendants became one of the most grotesque examples
of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system.”).
58
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 458–59.
59
Id. at 458.
60
Id. at 459.
61
In state court, Armstrong would have faced a sentence of three to nine years, but because federal
charges were brought, he faced a sentence of fifty-five years to life. See Brief for Respondents at 2–3,
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (No. 95-157), 1996 WL 17111, at *2–3; The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—
Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 166 (1996) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
62
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 459.
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The district court granted the defendants’ motion for discovery,
ordering the government to provide information on the cocaine cases it had
handled, its charging criteria, and the race of all the individuals prosecuted.63
The government refused to comply with the discovery order and the district
court dismissed the case.64 The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed.65
But the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s discovery order.66
First, the Court rejected Armstrong’s argument that Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16 entitled him to discovery regarding his selective prosecution
claim. The Court held “that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) authorizes defendants to
examine Government documents material to the preparation of their defense
against the Government’s case in chief, but not to the preparation of
selective-prosecution claims.”67
Second, the Court held that Armstrong had not met the standard to
obtain discovery for a selective prosecution claim. Like the Wayte Court, the
Armstrong Court began by listing various reasons why courts have limited
authority to review prosecutorial decisions. 68 Citing separation of powers
concerns, the Court explained that “[a] selective-prosecution claim asks a
court to exercise judicial power over a ‘special province’ of the Executive.”69
This “special province” is rooted in the President’s delegation to the
Attorney General of the “constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.’” 70 As a result, prosecutors’ decisions enjoy a
“presumption of regularity.” 71 Additionally, the Court explained that its
reluctance to review prosecutorial decision-making “stems from a concern
not to unnecessarily impair the performance of a core executive
constitutional function.”72 Such review “threatens to chill law enforcement
by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside
inquiry.”73 Finally, review “may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by
revealing the Government’s enforcement policy.”74
63

Id. (citing Brief for Respondents, supra note 61, at 161–62).
Id. at 461.
65
United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1510 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d, 517 U.S. 456
(1996).
66
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 458.
67
Id. at 463.
68
See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.
69
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)).
70
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
71
Id. (quoting United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)).
72
Id. at 465.
73
Id. (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607).
74
Id. (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607).
64
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Despite these concerns, the Court reiterated the long line of precedent
holding that “a prosecutor’s discretion is ‘subject to constitutional
constraints,’” 75 which include “the equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” 76 Equal protection principles
dictate “that the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on ‘an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification.’”77
In light of these conflicting considerations, the Court laid down the
standard for obtaining discovery in support of a selective prosecution claim:
a defendant must present “some evidence tending to show the existence of
the [two] essential elements of” a selective prosecution claim on the merits—
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. 78 Further, to prove the
discriminatory-effect prong, a defendant must make a “credible showing of
different treatment of similarly situated persons.”79
The discriminatory-effect prong’s “similarly situated” requirement
demands a comparison with individuals of a different race who could have
been prosecuted but were not. Drawing on Ah Sin, the Court required
defendants to “identify individuals who were not black and could have been
prosecuted for the offenses for which [defendants] were charged, but were
not so prosecuted.”80 In practical terms, this means that a defendant alleging
selective prosecution in a federal crack case must determine the identities
and the racial composition of two groups of people: (1) what we call the
selected group—all defendants prosecuted for crack by a certain federal
prosecutor’s office, and (2) the similarly situated benchmark group—others
of a different race who committed analogous crack offenses but were not
federally prosecuted. The Court explained that such a “rigorous standard”
was required because of the above justifications: separation of powers
concerns and the desire not to impair prosecutorial functions or
effectiveness.81

75

Id. at 464 (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979)).
Id. (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)).
77
Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
78
Id. at 470 (quoting United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974)). The Court
clarified that the “some evidence” standard was not a new rule, observing that various circuits had
expressed the same standard using a variety of verbal formulations, including “colorable basis,”
“substantial threshold showing,” “substantial and concrete basis,” and “reasonable likelihood.” Id. at 468.
79
Id. at 470.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 468 (“The justifications for a rigorous standard for the elements of a selective-prosecution
claim thus require a correspondingly rigorous standard for discovery in aid of such a claim.”).
76
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The Court held that Armstrong had not met the discriminatory-effect
prong because he had “failed to identify individuals who were not black and
could have been prosecuted for the offenses for which respondents were
charged, but were not so prosecuted.” 82 While Armstrong had properly
identified the selected group (the twenty-four people federal prosecutors in
Los Angeles had charged with federal crack cocaine offenses in 1991),83 he
had failed to identify a similarly situated benchmark group. The Court
explained that identifying similarly situated individuals “should not have
been an insuperable task” and posited that there might be, for example,
“similarly situated persons of other races [who] were prosecuted by the State
of California and were known to federal law enforcement officers, but were
not prosecuted in federal court.” 84 Further, rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s
assumption that “people of all races commit all types of crimes,”85 the Court
pointed to a United States Sentencing Commission Report concluding that
“[m]ore than 90% of the persons sentenced in 1994 for crack cocaine
trafficking were black” and determined there was no discriminatory effect.86
Of course, as the dissent observed, the racial disparity in sentencing says
nothing about the crime rate across races, since that disparity might itself be
evidence of racially selective prosecution tactics.87 Nonetheless, the Court
82

Id. at 470.
See id. at 459.
84
Id. Without access to discovery, it is unclear how a defendant would locate individuals “known to
federal law enforcement officers” who were not federally prosecuted. Even setting aside that requirement,
data regarding the races of individuals prosecuted for crack offenses in the state system, rather than the
federal system, are extremely difficult to obtain. See Drew S. Days III, Race and the Federal Criminal
Justice System: A Look at the Issue of Selective Prosecution, 48 ME. L. REV. 179, 188 (1996) (“Although
the U.S. Sentencing Commission publishes detailed information about federal defendants sentenced for
crack, there is no comparable information available for defendants prosecuted or sentenced for crack at
the state level. Relevant state statistics are particularly hard to come by because the majority of states do
not distinguish between crack and powder cocaine for penalty or record-keeping purposes.”).
85
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469 (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1516–17 (9th Cir.
1995)).
86
Id. (citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 107 tbl.45 (1994)).
87
Justice John Paul Stevens remarked, “[I]t is undisputed that the brunt of the elevated federal
penalties falls heavily on blacks. While 65% of the persons who have used crack are white, in 1993 they
represented only 4% of the federal offenders convicted of trafficking in crack. Eighty-eight percent of
such defendants were black.” Id. at 479–80 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens concluded that the
“figures [discussed by the majority] are entirely consistent with the allegation of selective prosecution.”
Id. at 482. Professor Pamela Karlan later pointed out that Armstrong’s statistics “are exactly what one
would expect if race were in fact the explanation for the pattern of prosecutorial decisions.” Pamela S.
Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2025 n.119
(1998); see also Katherine Beckett, Kris Nyrop & Lori Pfingst, Race, Drugs, and Policing:
Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 121 (2006) (“[A]lthough a
majority of drug transactions involving the five serious drugs under consideration here involve a white
drug dealer, 64 percent of those arrested for drug delivery in Seattle from January 1999 to April 2001
83
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concluded that the district court had erred in granting discovery. 88 For
Armstrong, the similarly situated requirement proved insurmountable, and
he was unable to meet the discriminatory-effect prong.
Armstrong’s second prong, discriminatory intent, makes the selective
prosecution discovery standard still harder to meet. Unless a defendant has
access to a smoking gun—for example, an admission by the government that
they targeted the defendant based on his race89 or racist text messages90—it
is hard to provide evidence of intent before receiving discovery. Many
discovery motions are denied for failure to provide “some evidence” of
discriminatory intent.91 As a result, “[t]he bar for selective [law] enforcement
and prosecution claims has been set at a nearly unreachable height for the
vast majority of criminal defendants, an example of an abstract right with no
practical remedy.”92
Since the Court established Armstrong’s demanding discovery
standard, there has not been a single successful selective prosecution or
selective law enforcement claim on the merits. 93 What is more, the last
were black.”); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1825 (1998)
(“Because the police can more easily attack illegal street markets than other sorts of illegal markets, the
crack trade has also generated more than its share of police stops and arrests. And because street markets
for crack are concentrated in poor black communities, a disproportionate number of those arrests and
sentences have been imposed on blacks.”).
88
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470–71.
89
See, e.g., United States v. Al Jibori, 90 F.3d 22, 24–26 (2d Cir. 1996). In Al Jibori, the prosecutors
explained that they targeted the defendant in part because of his ethnicity and nationality. Id. at 24, 26.
The Second Circuit made clear that if the government had kept quiet, discovery would not have been
granted. Id. at 25–26; see also McAdams, supra note 22, at 622 & n.76 (describing cases where the
defendant gets “lucky” by gaining access to data about unprosecuted offenders).
90
See, e.g., United States v. Mumphrey, 193 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (relying on
“race-based comments” by some San Francisco police officers for a discriminatory-intent finding and
granting discovery in support of a selective law enforcement claim).
91
See, e.g., United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 100 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. AlcarazArellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1265 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mesa-Roche, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1172,
1176 (D. Kan. 2003); United States v. Maclin, No. 18-CR-122, 2019 WL 1320315, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Mar.
22, 2019); United States v. Garcia-Pena, No. 17-CR-363-GBD, 2018 WL 6985220, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
19, 2018); United States v. Jackson, No. 16-CR-2362-WJ, 2018 WL 6602226, at *7 (D.N.M. Dec. 17,
2018); United States v. Viera, No. 14-CR-83-ER, 2015 WL 3833797, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2015).
92
Luna, supra note 19, at 1139; see also McAdams, supra note 22, at 640 (“The Armstrong holding
and the implications of its reasoning create a barrier to discovery that, for the great majority of criminal
cases, is insuperable.”). Moreover, the concept of “discriminatory intent” is notoriously elusive. See Aziz
Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1240–63 (2018).
93
See United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 215 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The government itself
concedes that ‘neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever found sufficient evidence to permit
discovery of a prosecutor’s decision-making policies and practices.’” (quoting Brief for Appellee United
States of America at 31, Washington, 869 F.3d 193 (No. 16-2795), 2016 WL 7034184, at *31)); Kristin
E. Kruse, Comment, Proving Discriminatory Intent in Selective Prosecution Challenges—An Alternative
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successful selective prosecution claim at either the state or federal level was
the very first one that reached the Court back in 1886—Yick Wo.94 In only a
handful of cases have defendants even been able to meet Armstrong and gain
discovery. 95 In practice, courts often deny discovery motions based on a
failure to provide sufficient evidence of either similarly situated individuals96
or discriminatory intent.97 The extraordinary difficulty of obtaining selective
prosecution discovery in a criminal case stands in stark contrast to the ready
discovery provided to civil plaintiffs.98
Armstrong is a deeply flawed decision, as many scholars have
observed. 99 By valuing prosecutorial discretion above equal protection
principles, it strikes exactly the wrong balance between deference to the
executive and individual rights. The Armstrong Court’s concerns about
chilling prosecutorial discretion mask a recurring “theme in the Court’s
treatment of race: ‘a fear of too much justice.’”100 Shutting down all selective
prosecution claims is not the answer. After all, courts review executive

Approach to United States v. Armstrong, 58 SMU L. REV. 1523, 1535 (2005) (“[Armstrong] is such a
‘significant barrier,’ however, that the last selective prosecution claim that was successfully brought was
the very first case that reached the Supreme Court—Yick Wo.”); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1539–40 (1981).
94
See Vorenberg, supra note 93, at 1539–40; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
95
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 975, 977–78 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding defendant
had provided “‘some evidence’ tending to show the existence of discriminatory effect” and discriminatory
intent based on law enforcement agents’ “outrageous and unprofessional” behavior that included agents
sending the defendant a postcard that pictured “a black woman with a basket of bananas on her head”);
United States v. Al Jibori, 90 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1996) (granting defendant’s discovery motion based
on government’s admission that it targeted defendant in part because of race). For more recent examples,
see United States v. Coley, No. 17-CR-89-JGC, 2018 WL 6304588, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2018), and
Mumphrey, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 1048, which found that “[d]efendants ha[d] satisfied Armstrong in respect
to their claim of selective enforcement” and granted discovery in a federal drug sting operation.
96
See, e.g., United States v. Thorpe, 471 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hedaithy,
392 F.3d 580, 608 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Hayes, 236 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Magana, 127 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997).
97
See supra note 91.
98
See Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (2015) (“If the civil plaintiff, who
seeks primarily the payment of money, must share his evidence . . . then surely the prosecutor, who seeks
the defendant’s loss of liberty or life, ought to suffer the same obligations.”); Bruce A. Green, Federal
Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64 MERCER L. REV. 639, 642 (2013) (“[T]he
limited scope of discovery in federal criminal cases cannot easily be reconciled with the liberality of
discovery in modern civil litigation.”).
99
See McAdams, supra note 22, at 640; Karlan, supra note 87, at 2025; Anne Bowen Poulin,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States v.
Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1076–79 (1997); Melissa L. Jampol, Goodbye to the Defense of
Selective Prosecution, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 932, 954–66 (1997).
100
Leading Cases, supra note 61, at 175 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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decisions all the time in other contexts.101 But here, blind deference to the
majority tramples the rights of the minority—or minorities, as the case may
be. And Armstrong’s flaws are multiplied when the deference it affords
prosecutors is inexplicably imported into an entirely different context—
policing.
II. RACIALLY SELECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT CLAIMS
The exacting Armstrong standard not only strikes the wrong balance in
the selective prosecution context, but for years has improperly blocked equal
protection claims against the police. Law enforcement officers may play an
even bigger role in the criminal legal system than prosecutors. On average,
between 2011 and 2015, 24% of the U.S. population over the age of sixteen
had some contact with law enforcement.102 Law enforcement officers’ vast
discretion creates great potential for racial bias.103 Police “have discretion
regarding whom to target (which individuals), as well as where to target
(which neighborhoods or communities).” 104 And discrimination by law
enforcement officers—both conscious and unconscious—is well
documented.105 Such discrimination can have lethal consequences.106
101

See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof.”); 5 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 28:1–15 (2d ed. 1984)
(collecting cases where courts review executive discretion).
102
ELIZABETH DAVIS, ANTHONY WHYDE & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CONTACTS
BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2015, at 6 tbl.5 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/cpp15.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K6B-32MC].
103
See ALEXANDER, supra note 14, at 123.
104
Id.
105
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 4–
5, 62–78 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C9R-WBVC] (finding the Ferguson Police
Department disproportionately harms Black people and such harm can be the result of intentional racial
bias); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 15 (2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download [https://perma.cc/FQT3-QK9X] (finding the Chicago
Police Department uses unreasonable force more often with Black people than white people and the
department has “tolerated racially discriminatory conduct”); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics,
and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 267 (1999) (finding that Black
drivers are stopped and ticketed by police more often than white drivers); Katherine Beckett, Kris Nyrop,
Lori Pfingst & Melissa Bowen, Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the Question of Race: Lessons
from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 419–41, 436 (2005) (finding that the Seattle Police Department’s
targeting of minorities “reflect[ed] a racialized conception of ‘the drug problem’”).
106
See, e.g., Olivia B. Waxman, George Floyd’s Death and the Long History of Racism in
Minneapolis, TIME (May 28, 2020, 5:14 PM), https://time.com/5844030/george-floyd-minneapolishistory/ [https://perma.cc/CX73-9RA3] (observing that a white officer who killed George Floyd, a Black
man, is part of a pattern of police racism in Minneapolis); Kate Linthicum, Louisville Demanded Justice
After Police Fatally Shot Breonna Taylor. Instead, It Lost Another Black Life, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 2020,

1004

115:987 (2021)

Discovering Racial Discrimination by the Police

The challenges criminal defendants face in obtaining the discovery
necessary to hold the police accountable for racially discriminatory practices
mirror and exceed the challenges in the selective prosecution context. This
Part analyzes recent cases that declined to apply Armstrong to equal
protection claims against law enforcement officers. Section II.A explains
how, in the years after Armstrong, federal courts regularly applied
Armstrong’s onerous discovery standard to equal protection claims against
the police, resulting in the denial of nearly every discovery claim.
Section II.B details how, more recently, three federal appellate courts
declined to apply Armstrong’s discovery standard to racially selective law
enforcement claims and lowered the standard for defendants seeking
discovery about race discrimination by the police. In addition, it untangles
the murky and conflicting legal standards that have replaced Armstrong.
Section II.C synthesizes these recent cases, concluding that a lower
discovery standard for selective law enforcement claims correctly
appreciates the differences between prosecutors and law enforcement
officers and enables courts to assess claims against the police on the merits.
A. Armstrong Applied to Selective Law Enforcement Claims
For many years, courts applied Armstrong’s legal framework to racially
selective law enforcement claims. At the merits stage of a selective law
enforcement challenge, courts applied the selective prosecution merits
standard articulated in Wayte and reiterated in Armstrong, holding that “[a]
defendant challenging a criminal prosecution at . . . the law enforcement . . .
inflection point[] must provide ‘clear evidence’ of discriminatory effect and
discriminatory intent.”107 Every circuit to address the issue continues to use
the same merits standard for both selective prosecution and selective law
enforcement claims.108
At the discovery stage of a selective law enforcement challenge, courts
also applied Armstrong’s standard, requiring defendants to present “some
7:57 AM), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-06-08/protesters-louisville-police-killingbreonna-taylor-david-mcatee-george-floyd (last visited Dec. 12, 2020) (reporting that a Black man
protesting the police killing of an innocent Black woman was himself shot and killed by police).
107
United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 214 (3d Cir. 2017).
108
See Flowers v. Fiore, 359 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 2004) (requiring plaintiff to show “that he was
treated differently from similarly situated non-African-American motorists and that the action taken
against him was motivated, at least in part, by his race”); Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 141, 151–
52 (2d Cir. 2012); Washington, 869 F.3d at 214; United States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir.
1996); Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 227 (5th Cir. 2012); Bennett v. City of Eastpointe,
410 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 822–23 (8th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Sellers, 906 F.3d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252,
1264 (10th Cir. 2006).
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evidence tending to show” both discriminatory effect and intent. 109 Since
both selective prosecution and selective law enforcement claims are rooted
in the Equal Protection Clause, courts reflexively assumed Armstrong’s
discovery standard applied across the board. For example, in United States
v. Barlow, the Seventh Circuit held that although “Barlow complains not of
selective prosecution, but of racial profiling, a selective law enforcement
tactic,” the “same analysis governs both types of claims: a defendant seeking
discovery on a selective enforcement claim must meet the same ‘ordinary
equal protection standards’ that Armstrong outlines for selective prosecution
claims.”110
The Fourth Circuit, 111 Tenth Circuit, 112 and district courts across the
country 113 likewise adhere to this view, applying Armstrong’s discovery
standard to selective law enforcement claims. In United States v. AlcarazArellano, for example, Alcaraz-Arellano sought discovery alleging that a law
enforcement officer’s decision to stop him was motivated by race. 114 The
Tenth Circuit, relying on Armstrong, held that defendants “must produce
‘some evidence’ of both discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent” to
gain discovery.115 The court remarked that “[t]he elements [of the discovery
standard] are essentially the same for a selective-enforcement claim” and a
selective prosecution claim.116
In contrast, before Barlow, the Seventh Circuit had previously
suggested in the civil context that there might be good reasons for treating
selective prosecution and law enforcement claims differently. In Chavez v.
109

See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996) (quoting United States v. Berrios,
501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974)).
110
310 F.3d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465). Barlow is often cited
for this proposition. See, e.g., United States v. Paxton, No. 13-CR-0103, 2014 WL 1648746, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 17, 2014) (“Defendants’ racial profiling claim is essentially a selective enforcement claim,
instead of a selective prosecution claim. The two claims are, however, analyzed under the same standard.”
(citing Barlow, 310 F.3d at 1010)); Urbanique Prod. v. City of Montgomery, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1223–
24 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (quoting Barlow, 310 F.3d at 1010).
111
United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 100 (4th Cir. 2016) (denying discovery because defendants
“[did] not put forth ‘some evidence’ making a ‘credible showing’ of the elements of a discrimination
claim”).
112
Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d at 1264.
113
See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, No. 16-CR-2362-WJ, 2018 WL 6602226, at *6 (D.N.M. Dec.
17, 2018) (stating that the Tenth Circuit adopted the Armstrong standard for discovery in selective
enforcement actions (citing Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d at 1264)); United States v. Viera, No. 14-CR-83ER, 2015 WL 3833797, at *2 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2015) (“[F]or discovery purposes, [selective law
enforcement and selective prosecution claims] are analyzed under the same legal standard.”).
114
441 F.3d at 1261.
115
Id. at 1264 (quoting Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470).
116
Id.
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Illinois State Police, the Seventh Circuit became the first court to recognize
the difference between the two types of claims and to create a lower standard
of proof for selective law enforcement claims, at least in the civil context.117
Chavez involved a civil class action § 1983 lawsuit in which Black and
Hispanic motorists alleged that the Illinois State Police had engaged in racial
profiling at drug-interdiction checkpoints. 118 Chavez emphasized that
Armstrong “narrowly focused on the constitutional implications of
interfering with the prosecutorial function, a factor at the heart of a criminal
defendant’s claim of selective prosecution.” 119 Chavez, however, was
stopped by law enforcement officers but never prosecuted.120 The Seventh
Circuit ultimately concluded that “[t]his case is . . . not like Armstrong”
because it “involves police conduct, not prosecutorial discretion.”121
Chavez then somewhat relaxed the standard of proof required to
demonstrate discriminatory effect. Under Armstrong, a claimant would have
to show that “similarly situated defendants of other races could have been
prosecuted, but were not.”122 Chavez observed: “Armstrong emphasized . . .
the fact that it would not be impossible to name a similarly situated
individual treated differently in the context of a selective prosecution
claim.”123 But Chavez recognized that this would be a more difficult burden
to meet in the selective law enforcement context, because it would be
virtually impossible to identify a particular individual whom the police did
not stop.124 Chavez therefore held that the plaintiffs “do not have to provide
the court with the name of an individual who was not stopped; instead they
may attempt to use statistics to show that the [police] treated them differently
than other motorists who were similarly situated.” 125 Despite Chavez’s
recognition that it is more difficult to provide “similarly situated” evidence
in the law enforcement context than the prosecution context, that difference
did not translate into a different discovery standard in the criminal context
for over a decade.126

117

251 F.3d 612, 638–39 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 620.
119
Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
120
Id. at 624.
121
Id. at 640.
122
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996).
123
251 F.3d at 640.
124
Id. at 639–40.
125
Id. at 640.
126
The court denied Chavez’s motion on the ground that he had failed to meet the granular similarly
situated requirement to prove discriminatory effect. Id. at 640–45.
118
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Although Chavez was a civil selective law enforcement case, the same
basic question arises in both the civil and criminal contexts: Did the police
violate the Constitution? While this Article focuses on the criminal context,
the distinction Chavez drew between prosecutors and the police applies
equally.
B. Discovery in Selective Law Enforcement Cases
Spurred by racial disparities in the ATF’s fake stash house operations,
criminal defense attorneys have launched a recent wave of litigation seeking
discovery to support claims of racially selective law enforcement. Courts
have reacted by criticizing the fake stash house operation, referring to it as a
“disreputable tactic,”127 a “tawdry” and “tired sting operation [that] seems to
be directed at unsophisticated, and perhaps desperate, defendants who easily
snap at the bait put out for them by [the government agent].”128 The Ninth
Circuit, for example, has accused law enforcement of “trolling for targets”
when the confidential informant “provocatively cast his bait in places
defined only by economic and social conditions.” 129 Judges have even
expressed “disgust with the ATF’s conduct” in these cases.130
Three courts of appeals have responded to this recent litigation by
recognizing the differences between prosecutors and the police and lowering
the Armstrong discovery standard in the selective law enforcement context:
the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Davis,131 the Third Circuit in United
States v. Washington,132 and the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Sellers.133
After distinguishing Armstrong, these courts jettisoned its impractical
similarly situated requirement for the discriminatory-effect prong and

127
United States v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401, 414 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also id. at 416 (remarking that “[t]he operators of stash houses would pay law
enforcement to sting potential stash house robbers” because a “sting both eliminates one potential stash
house robber (unless the defendant was entrapped) and deters other criminals from joining stash house
robberies, since they may turn out to be stings”).
128
United States v. Lewis, 641 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 2011).
129
United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 303 (9th Cir. 2013). For further criticism of stash house
operations, see Tinto, supra note 5, at 1446–51.
130
United States v. Paxton, No. 13-CR-0103, 2018 WL 4504160, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2018);
see also United States v. Hudson, 3 F. Supp. 3d 772, 786 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“Zero. That’s the amount of
drugs that the Government has taken off the streets as the result of this case and the hundreds of other
fake stash-house cases around the country. That’s the problem with creating crime: the Government is
not making the country any safer or reducing the actual flow of drugs.”), rev’d and remanded sub nom.
United States v. Dunlap, 593 F. App’x 619 (9th Cir. 2014).
131
793 F.3d 712, 719–23 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
132
869 F.3d 193, 214–21 (3d Cir. 2017).
133
906 F.3d 848, 852–56 (9th Cir. 2018).
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eliminated the discriminatory-intent requirement. Sellers and Washington
went on to craft new, lower discovery standards for selective law
enforcement claims, with the Ninth Circuit holding either prong alone
sufficient to obtain discovery. This Section chronicles these important
developments.
1. Distinguishing Armstrong
The Seventh Circuit was the first to hold that Armstrong’s discovery
standard does not apply in the selective law enforcement context. In United
States v. Davis, defendants charged as part of an ATF fake stash house
operation sought discovery in support of a racially selective law enforcement
claim. 134 They established that of the ninety-seven people the ATF had
selected for its fake stash house operation in Chicago since 2006, seventyfive were Black, sixteen were Hispanic, and six were white.135 The district
court granted discovery and the government appealed.
In Davis, the government argued on appeal that Armstrong applied and
that the defendants had failed to meet its comparative standard.136 Applying
Armstrong would have required the defense to make one of two showings.
First, the defendants would have had to identify one or more similarly
situated individuals of a different race whom the ATF did not select137—an
impossible standard, since there is no way to identify the null set of people
the ATF did not approach to commit a manufactured crime. Alternatively,
the defendants would have had to identify a similarly situated benchmark
group138 whose racial composition differed from that of the selected group in
a statistically significant way.139 But this, too, was an impossible standard for
the defendants to meet because the government refused to provide
134

793 F.3d at 714–15.
Defendants-Appellees’ Brief at 6, Davis, 793 F.3d 712 (No. 14-1124), 2014 WL 1428885, at *6
(quoting Defendant’s Reply to Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Discovery Regarding
Racial Profiling & Selective Prosecution at 5–6, United States v. Davis, No. 13-CR-0063 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
7, 2013), ECF No. 120.
136
Davis, 793 F.3d at 715; see also Expert Report of Max M. Schanzenbach at 2, United States v.
Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 12-CR-0632-RC), ECF No. 555 (arguing that “[w]hen
any one of [Dr. Fagan’s] assumptions is relaxed or tested, the results no longer support an inference of
racial discrimination”).
137
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996).
138
In this context, the benchmark group would consist of others of a different race who were not
approached by the ATF but were otherwise similarly situated to the people the ATF had selected to
commit stash house offenses.
139
Reply Brief & Supplemental Short Appendix of the United States at 14, Davis, 793 F.3d 712 (No.
14-1124), 2014 WL 1664051, at *14 (“Even under the most expansive construction of the similarly
situated requirement, the entire adult population provides no meaningful basis on which to conduct a
comparison with these defendants.”).
135
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information that would enable the defendants to define a similarly situated
benchmark group. Specifically, the government refused to disclose the
ATF’s criteria for selecting defendants for its stash house operation—that is,
the purportedly race-neutral rules that the agency claimed to use to determine
whom to target.140 The en banc Seventh Circuit held that the defendants had
not met Armstrong’s similarly situated requirement because “[t]he district
court did not identify any similarly situated [white] person who had not been
prosecuted.”141
But that was not the end of the inquiry. The Seventh Circuit
distinguished Armstrong and concluded that a different discovery standard
should govern selective law enforcement claims. 142 The court recognized
that “Armstrong was about prosecutorial discretion,” not the discretion of
law enforcement officers. 143 It further observed that there were salient
differences between police and prosecutors that counseled in favor of a
different standard.144 Unlike prosecutors, the court explained, “[a]gents of
the ATF and FBI are not protected by a powerful privilege or covered by a
presumption of constitutional behavior.”145 The court continued:
Unlike prosecutors, [law enforcement] agents regularly testify in criminal cases,
and their credibility may be relentlessly attacked by defense counsel. They also
may have to testify in pretrial proceedings, such as hearings on motions to
suppress evidence, and again their honesty is open to challenge. Statements that
agents make in affidavits for search or arrest warrants may be contested, and
the court may need their testimony to decide whether if shorn of untruthful
statements the affidavits would have established probable cause. Agents may
be personally liable for withholding evidence from prosecutors and thus causing
violations of the constitutional requirement that defendants have access to
material, exculpatory evidence. Before holding hearings (or civil trials) district
judges regularly, and properly, allow discovery into nonprivileged aspects of
what agents have said or done.146

140
The Seventh Circuit observed that the law enforcement agency’s targeting criteria could help a
defendant prove a selective law enforcement claim on the merits: “Analysis of the targeting criteria (and
whether agents followed those rules in practice) could shed light on whether an initial suspicion of race
discrimination in this case is justified.” Davis, 793 F.3d at 723.
141
Id. at 715.
142
Id. at 720–21.
143
Id. at 720.
144
Id. at 720–21.
145
Id. at 720.
146
Id. at 720–21 (citations omitted).
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The court held that these differences justified applying a different discovery
standard for selective law enforcement claims—one that is lower than
Armstrong’s selective prosecution discovery standard.147
Over the next few years, two other federal courts of appeals built on the
distinctions the Seventh Circuit had drawn between prosecutors and law
enforcement officers and likewise distinguished Armstrong. In similar
selective law enforcement challenges to fake stash house operations, the
Third and Ninth Circuits subsequently agreed with “the core rationale of
Davis: the special solicitude shown to prosecutorial discretion, which
animated the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Armstrong . . . does not
inevitably flow to the actions of law enforcement, or even to prosecutors
acting in an investigative capacity.” 148 The Third and Ninth Circuits
bolstered Davis’s reasoning. In United States v. Washington, the Third
Circuit highlighted a key distinction from prosecutors—law enforcement
officers’ limited immunity:
A challenge to a law-enforcement policy also implicates another area where
immunity is limited. The ATF reverse sting model is familiar to us and other
courts precisely because it is a defined operation, one with policies, manuals,
targeting criteria, and standards. Its appearance from coast to coast is not some
kind of convergent law-enforcement evolution, but instead is due to the
promulgation of official policies by a federal agency. Claims of unconstitutional
policies or practices, lodged against entities rather than individuals, often cannot
be met with qualified or good-faith immunity defenses at all.149

In United States v. Sellers, the Ninth Circuit joined the Davis and
Washington courts in recognizing that “[s]elective prosecution is not
selective [law] enforcement—especially not in the stash house reverse-sting
context.”150 Like the other courts, the Sellers court summarized the salient
differences between the two actors: “[A]gents occupy a different space and
role in our system than prosecutors; they are not charged with the same

147

See id. at 721–23.
United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 219 (3d Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Sellers,
906 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Today we join the Third and Seventh Circuits and hold that
Armstrong’s rigorous discovery standard for selective prosecution cases does not apply strictly to
discovery requests in selective enforcement claims like Sellers’s.”). In Sellers, the defendants established
“that of 51 defendants indicted in stash house reverse-sting operations between 2007 and 2013, at least
39 were black or Hispanic.” Id. at 851; see also id. (noting that an agent involved in the operation “testified
that more than 55 of the approximately 60 individuals who have been indicted in his stash house reversesting operations are people of color.”).
149
869 F.3d at 219–20.
150
906 F.3d at 852–53.
148
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constitutional functions, and their decisions are more often scrutinized by—
and in—courts.”151
The Ninth Circuit highlighted an additional reason for applying a lower
discovery standard in the law enforcement context. The Sellers court
observed that the similarly situated element of the discriminatory-effect
prong was especially daunting when applied to policing: “Asking a
defendant claiming selective [law] enforcement to prove who could have
been targeted by an informant, but was not, or who the ATF could have
investigated, but did not, is asking him to prove a negative; there is simply
no statistical record for a defendant to point to.”152 The court thus recognized
that Armstrong’s cruel catch-22 is compounded in the selective law
enforcement context. As hard as it is to prove discrimination without
discovery, it is still more difficult to identify particular people who—by
definition—had no contact with the police.153
These differences between prosecutors and police led the Third154 and
Ninth Circuits,155 as well as at least one district court,156 to join the Seventh
Circuit’s conclusion that “the sort of considerations that led to the outcome
in Armstrong do not apply to a contention that agents of the FBI or ATF
engaged in racial discrimination when selecting targets for sting operations,
or when deciding which suspects to refer for prosecution.” 157 That
recognition, in turn, set the stage for these appellate courts to depart from
Armstrong’s discovery standard in the selective law enforcement context and
forge an entirely new standard for discovery—a key development in
safeguarding equal protection rights.158
151

Id. at 853.
Id. (citing Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 640 (7th Cir. 2001)).
153
The Third Circuit gestured to this same compounded catch-22 in summarizing Washington’s
argument: “Washington also points to the difficulty of obtaining pre-discovery statistics in selective
prosecution cases, arguing that requiring the same in law-enforcement cases—when there are likely to be
no records of similarly situated individuals who were not arrested or investigated—would transform the
functional impossibility of Armstrong/Bass into a complete impossibility.” Washington, 869 F.3d at 216;
see also McAdams, supra note 22, at 617–18 (“When . . . the defendants complain that similarly situated
Whites are not arrested or prosecuted at all, there will be no records to find to meet the similarly situated
requirement.”). In United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 864 (2002), the Court held that the Armstrong
standard applies to motions for discovery regarding a claim alleging selective application of the death
penalty based on race.
154
Washington, 869 F.3d at 219–20.
155
Sellers, 906 F.3d at 852–54.
156
United States v. Lopez, 415 F. Supp. 3d 422, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
157
United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 721 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
158
Shortly after Davis was decided, the Fourth Circuit cited it with approval, noting that the “Seventh
Circuit offers cogent analysis” regarding the differences between law enforcement officers and
prosecutors. United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 101 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Davis, 793 F.3d at 720–21).
152
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2. A New Discovery Standard
Although the Seventh Circuit held that Armstrong does not govern
discovery requests in the selective enforcement context, it did not articulate
a new discovery standard in its place. Davis acknowledged that “[t]he racial
disproportion in stash-house prosecutions remains troubling, . . . and is a
legitimate reason for discovery provided that the district court does not
transgress Armstrong or an applicable privilege,”159 for example, by ordering
discovery of a prosecutor’s files without satisfying the Armstrong standard.
The court ultimately found the particular discovery order to be overbroad
and instructed the district court to pursue a more nuanced approach, but
recognized that “some of the [defendants’] discovery asks for information
from supervisors or case agents of the FBI and ATF, and this is outside the
scope of Armstrong, the executive privilege, and the deliberative-process
privilege.”160
Rather than devising a new legal standard, the Seventh Circuit laid out
a process for district courts to follow at the discovery stage of a selective law
enforcement claim: “If the initial inquiry gives the judge reason to think that
suspects of another race, and otherwise similarly situated, would not have
been offered the opportunity for a stash-house robbery, it might be
appropriate to require the FBI and ATF to disclose, in confidence, their
criteria for stash-house stings.”161 At a minimum, this framework authorizes
judges to require law enforcement agencies to disclose their operational
criteria based on less than Armstrong requires. It is essential for a defendant
seeking to litigate a selective law enforcement claim on the merits to obtain
law enforcement’s criteria because those criteria define the benchmark
group. For example, if the ATF’s criteria for its fake stash house operations
are to target people with prior convictions for violence, drugs, and robbery,
then the benchmark group will consist of the entire universe of people with
those prior convictions in the same geographic area and time period as the
operation. If the benchmark group is substantially more white than the people
the ATF selected—the selected group—that is evidence of discriminatory
effect. Davis’s lower discovery standard makes it possible for a defendant to
gather the evidence needed to prove discrimination on the merits.

Despite this nod, the Fourth Circuit ultimately denied the defendants’ motion for discovery based on their
failure to demonstrate discriminatory intent and did not craft a new discovery standard. Id. at 100.
159
793 F.3d at 722. In particular, the district court had found that “the overwhelming majority of the
defendants named [were] individuals of color.” Id. at 719 (quoting United States v. Davis, No. 13-CR0063 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2013), ECF No. 124; see also Defendants-Appellees’ Brief, supra note 135, at 2.
160
Davis, 793 F.3d at 722.
161
Id. at 723 (emphasis added).
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After Davis, the Third and Ninth Circuits fashioned a lower discovery
standard for selective law enforcement claims, altering both the
discriminatory-effect and discriminatory-intent prongs of Armstrong.
Regarding discriminatory effect, both courts eliminated the similarly situated
requirement, holding that a defendant seeking discovery “need not . . . show
that . . . similarly situated persons of a different race or equal protection
classification were not arrested or investigated by law enforcement.” 162
Accordingly, a defendant alleging race discrimination does not need to
identify particular individuals who are similarly situated to the defendant but
were not arrested—such as Ah Sin’s non-Chinese residential gamblers.163 A
defendant likewise does not need to identify through statistics a granular
similarly situated benchmark group that is more white than the selected
group that includes the defendant. Instead, Washington held that a defendant
seeking discovery must present “a proffer that shows ‘some evidence’ of
discriminatory effect,” and that “proffer must contain reliable statistical
evidence, or its equivalent.”164
After the elimination of the similarly situated requirement, it is not
entirely clear what evidence a defendant must provide to meet the
discriminatory-effect prong under Washington and Sellers. Perhaps a
defendant can establish discriminatory effect simply by showing that the
selected group—consisting of himself and others targeted in a certain type
of law enforcement operation—is composed primarily of people of color,
without drawing any comparison to a benchmark group. 165 But it is more
162
United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 221 (3d Cir. 2017); United States v. Sellers, 906 F.3d
848, 855 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[A] defendant need not proffer evidence that similarly-situated individuals of
a different race were not investigated or arrested to receive discovery on his selective enforcement claim
in a stash house reverse-sting operation case.”).
163
See supra text accompanying notes 41–43 (discussing Ah Sin). In Chavez, the Seventh Circuit
recognized the difficulty of identifying specific people who were not selected by the police. See Chavez
v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[P]laintiffs who allege that they were stopped
due to racial profiling would not, barring some type of test operation, be able to provide the names of
other similarly situated motorists who were not stopped.”). But see United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93,
99–100 (4th Cir. 2016) (defining the proper comparison group in stash house sting operations as
individuals who would have been “receptive to a stash house robbery scenario” and who the “ATF had
the means of infiltrating”); United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 1010 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (requiring
the defendant to point to individuals that were “actually available for selection by the ATF and willing to
commit a stash house sting”).
164
869 F.3d at 220–21.
165
Professor Richard McAdams has previously advocated for this kind of standard in the selective
prosecution context. McAdams, supra note 22, at 624–25 (proposing the rule that “a court may order
discovery on a selective prosecution claim if it has a reasonable basis for finding that race and the decision
to prosecute are correlated, meaning that prosecutors charge a significantly higher proportion of violators
of the defendant’s race than of other races”). Professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann cogently argues that
requiring any comparative showing (the “counterfactual causal model”) in this context is incorrect
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likely that Sellers’s statement that a defendant need not proffer evidence
about “similarly-situated individuals of a different race”166 does not eliminate
a comparative standard altogether, but simply means that the defendant need
not identify particular people who are similarly situated to him. Presumably
the defendant still must present some comparative evidence showing that law
enforcement officers targeted people of color to a greater degree than their
representation in the general population or some other benchmark group.
Washington’s requirement of “reliable statistical evidence,”167 for example,
suggests that a defendant must provide comparative evidence demonstrating
a racial disproportion between the selected group and some benchmark
group.
One district court, after jettisoning Armstrong’s similarly situated
requirement for the discriminatory-effect prong, went so far as to require that
the comparative showing be statistically significant. In United States v.
Lopez, another fake stash house case, the court held that “the appropriate
standard is that where a defendant who is a member of a protected group can
show that that group has been singled out for reverse sting operations to a
statistically significant extent in comparison with other groups, this is
sufficient to warrant further inquiry and discovery.”168 The court in Lopez
found that the defendants had met this standard by showing that “not a single
one of the 179 individuals targeted in DEA reverse sting operations in SDNY
in the past ten years was white, and that all but two were African-American
or Hispanic,” a disparity that was “in stark contrast to the racial makeup of
New York and Bronx Counties.”169 Like the Third and Ninth Circuits, the
court in Lopez found that a comparative discriminatory-effect showing was
because it isolates racial signifiers and pretends “the social facts of race [are] not what they are today in
the United States.” Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of Counterfactual Causal
Thinking About Detecting Racial Discrimination, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1221 (2019). The
counterfactual causal model does not include a “prior sociological account of the distribution and meaning
of [everything held constant] by different racial/ethnic groups.” Id. at 1192. As a result, “there is no
limiting principle on what should or should not be stripped away in order to get at some imagined solid
state of race or ethnicity.” Id.
166
906 F.3d at 855 (emphasis added).
167
869 F.3d at 221.
168
415 F. Supp. 3d 422, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
169
Id. A district court in New Mexico likewise found discriminatory effect based on a broad
benchmark group. See Order Granting Discovery at 4, United States v. Casanova, No. 16-CR-2917-JAP
(D.N.M. June 12, 2017), ECF No. 57. In Casanova, the defendant presented statistical evidence of a
disparity between the racial makeup of defendants arrested in an ATF drug operation (the selected group)
and defendants arrested in drug-and-firearm cases in Albuquerque and the District of New Mexico (the
benchmark group). Id. at 2. The court purported to be applying Armstrong, but nevertheless concluded
that the defendant had demonstrated both discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent and granted
discovery. Id. at 1, 4.
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sufficient to grant discovery; no evidence of discriminatory intent was
necessary.170
Given these ambiguities, a defendant seeking to demonstrate
discriminatory effect would do best to gather data about the racial
composition of the selected group and of the general population with the goal
of establishing that law enforcement agents arrested people of color to a
greater degree than is warranted by their representation in the general
population. For example, on remand, Washington met this new lower
standard using census data.171 The district court ordered the government to
provide “[a] list by case name and number of each defendant in every stash
house robbery sting conducted” by the ATF, including the racial makeup of
the defendants in those cases, the circumstances of the stash house targeting,
and information about individuals who were targeted but not arrested.172
Regarding the discriminatory-intent prong, both Washington and
Sellers held that a defendant “need not, at the initial stage, provide ‘some
evidence’ of discriminatory intent.”173 This was a monumental development
in equal protection jurisprudence. For the prior two decades, the
discriminatory-intent requirement—especially in combination with the
similarly situated aspect of the discriminatory-effect requirement—had been
an insurmountable barrier for defendants seeking discovery from police and
prosecutors alike.174
The Third and Ninth Circuits differed slightly in the new role each
ascribed to discriminatory intent. In Washington, the Third Circuit added a
strange caveat: “[T]he proffer must be strong enough to support a reasonable
inference of discriminatory intent and non-enforcement” against similarly
situated people of other races.175 This caveat muddies the waters as it seems
170

See 415 F. Supp. 3d at 425–27.
See Motion for Discovery Pertaining to Claim of Selective Enforcement at 5–6, United States v.
Washington, No. 2:13-CR-0171-JHS (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2018), ECF No. 319 (using census data to
compare the racial composition of the relevant geographic area to that of the defendants charged in fake
stash house operations).
172
See Order at 1–2, Washington, No. 13-CR-0171-JHS (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2018), ECF No. 327.
This discovery enabled Washington to file a motion to dismiss, which is currently pending. Motion to
Vacate Judgment & Dismiss Superseding Indictment at 4–6, Washington, No. 2:13-CR-0171-JHS (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 7, 2020), ECF No. 380.
173
United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 221 (3d Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Sellers,
906 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[O]btaining discovery on a selective enforcement claim does not
‘require some evidence tending to show the existence of [both] essential elements of the defense,
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent.’” (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468
(1996))).
174
See supra Section I.B; supra Part II.
175
Washington, 869 F.3d at 221 (emphasis added).
171
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to suggest that the defendant’s evidentiary proffer must support an inference
of the two requirements the court seemingly eliminated.176 Conversely, in
Sellers, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant raising a selective law
enforcement claim need only meet one prong of Armstrong, thus rendering
the discriminatory-intent prong entirely optional. 177 Rather than using the
discriminatory-intent requirement as a bar to discovery, Sellers repurposed
it as a second avenue for obtaining discovery—if the defendant cannot
provide some evidence of discriminatory effect, the defendant can instead
present some evidence of discriminatory intent, such as evidence of overt
racial bias in the form of racist communications among law enforcement
officers.178
In addition to altering the two prongs of Armstrong, the Ninth Circuit
lowered the evidentiary threshold for obtaining discovery still further by
redefining “some evidence” to mean that defendants simply “must have
something more than mere speculation to be entitled to discovery.”179 The
court explained that “what that something looks like will vary from case to
case,” thus giving district courts a great deal of discretion to determine how
much evidence is enough to grant discovery. 180 This low evidentiary
threshold stands in contrast to the Third Circuit’s requirement that a
defendant present “reliable statistical evidence” to establish discriminatory
effect.181
In a separate concurring opinion in Sellers, Judge Jacqueline Nguyen
reflected on how law enforcement’s focus on certain geographic areas might
provide additional proof of discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent.
She concluded that “[e]vidence that law enforcement agents or their
confidential informants scoured disproportionately minority neighborhoods
in search of stash house reverse sting targets is evidence of discriminatory
effect.” 182 Regarding discriminatory intent, Judge Nguyen questioned
176
Cf. id. (holding that a defendant “need not, at the initial stage, provide ‘some evidence’ of
discriminatory intent”).
177
906 F.3d at 856 (“[E]ven if the dissent were correct that Sellers presented no evidence of
discriminatory effect, evidence of discriminatory intent may be enough to warrant discovery.” (citation
omitted)).
178
Id. at 856 n.11 (“Indeed, even in the selective prosecution context, the Supreme Court left open
the possibility that direct admissions by prosecutors of discriminatory purpose . . . would entitle the
defendant to discovery without showing some evidence of discriminatory effect.”); see also, e.g., United
States v. Mumphrey, 193 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (relying on “race-based comments”
by some San Francisco police officers to grant discovery in support of a selective law enforcement claim).
179
Sellers, 906 F.3d at 856.
180
Id.
181
Washington, 869 F.3d at 221.
182
Sellers, 906 F.3d at 861 (Nguyen, J., concurring).
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“whether conducting stash house operations almost exclusively in
neighborhoods known to be black and Hispanic, and excluding
neighborhoods known to be white, is in fact a ‘facially neutral’ policy,”
positing that agents “limiting their operations to minority neighborhoods . . .
[is] also potentially indicative of discriminatory purpose.”183
Finally, while Davis, Washington, and Sellers increase the likelihood of
defendants obtaining discovery, no court has lowered Armstrong’s high
merits standard in the policing context. 184 Given the near impossibility of
identifying similarly situated individuals even with discovery, 185 courts
should seriously consider lowering the merits standard as well.
*

*

*

Davis, Washington, and Sellers recognized that a strict application of
Armstrong is inappropriate for selective law enforcement claims. Davis,
however, did not articulate a clear standard applicable in future cases.
Washington formulated a new standard in Armstrong’s place: a defendant
need only present “some evidence” of discriminatory effect and need not
present evidence of similarly situated individuals or evidence of
discriminatory intent. Sellers allowed a defendant to meet just one of the two

183
Id. at 860–61. One district court in New Mexico found that a defendant provided “some evidence”
of discriminatory intent by highlighting the “ATF’s focus on neighborhoods with a predominantly
minority population, use of primarily African-American confidential informants (CIs), and targeting of
African-American neighborhood contacts.” Order Granting Discovery, supra note 169, at 3; cf. KohlerHausmann, supra note 165, at 1188–91 (arguing that discrimination in a hypersegregated city may be
masked in statistical comparisons because a neighborhood’s “racial history [has] produced a social
geography [where] few if any majority-black neighborhoods . . . share all relevant characteristics with
majority-white neighborhoods”).
184
See, e.g., Sellers, 906 F.3d at 856 (“Thus, obtaining discovery on a selective enforcement claim
does not ‘require some evidence tending to show the existence of [both] essential elements of the defense,
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent,’ notwithstanding that the defendant will eventually need
to show both elements to prevail on the claim.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996))).
185
At the merits stage in the Chicago stash house litigation, for example, one judge denied
defendants’ motion to dismiss for racially selective law enforcement because they had not provided
evidence that the individuals in their similarly situated benchmark group were “actually available for
selection by the ATF and willing to commit a stash house [robbery].” United States v. Brown, 299 F.
Supp. 3d 976, 1010 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (emphasis added). Yet the benchmark group was by definition
composed of people whom the ATF did not approach to commit a stash house robbery. It is therefore
hard to imagine how a defendant could go about showing the subjective willingness of anyone in that
benchmark group. This example illustrates the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of meeting the similarly
situated standard, even with discovery in hand.
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Armstrong prongs and eliminated the impractical similarly situated
requirement, holding that a defendant need only provide “something more
than mere speculation” to demonstrate discriminatory effect. Under Sellers
and Washington, however, it remains unclear whether or to what degree
defendants are required to present a comparative analysis to demonstrate
discriminatory effect.
As this progression demonstrates, Davis ushered in a significant change
in the discovery standard for defendants challenging racially selective law
enforcement practices. Although that new standard was honed in the context
of fake stash house operations, it applies broadly to any case in which a
criminal defendant is seeking discovery to support a claim of race
discrimination by the police.186
C. Resolving the Split in Authority
In the wake of these three recent circuit court cases, other courts should
adopt a lower discovery standard for selective law enforcement claims.
Without a lower standard, potentially meritorious claims cannot move
forward and discrimination will go unchecked.
Davis, Washington, and Sellers were correct in adopting a lower
discovery standard for three reasons. First, the doctrines that underlie
Armstrong’s selective prosecution holding do not apply in the law
enforcement context. Second, requiring a similarly situated showing to
establish discriminatory effect is especially unworkable in the law
enforcement context. Third, a lower discovery standard is necessary to
enable criminal defendants to litigate selective law enforcement challenges
on the merits.
The first justification for a lower discovery standard in the selective law
enforcement context relates to the salient differences between prosecutors
and law enforcement officers. Armstrong, at its core, rests on “the special
solicitude shown to prosecutorial discretion”—not law enforcement
discretion. 187 In particular, a “presumption of regularity” supports
prosecutorial decisions and, “in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary,
courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.”188
186
See, e.g., United States v. Mumphrey, 193 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (agreeing
with the reasoning in Davis and granting discovery in support of a selective law enforcement claim in an
ordinary federal drug sting operation); Order Granting Discovery, supra note 169, at 4 (granting discovery
in a non-stash house ATF drug sting operation).
187
United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 219 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis added).
188
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting United States v. Chem. Found.,
Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)).
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But the “presumption of regularity” does not apply to law enforcement
officers. Armstrong took the phrase “presumption of regularity” from United
States v. Chemical Foundation, in which the Court discussed the
presumption as applied to a “public officer” appointed by the President
pursuant to an executive order and a statute—someone with far more
authority than a law enforcement officer. 189 When elaborating on this
“presumption of regularly,” the Armstrong Court also quoted Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, a case about a prosecutor’s discretion to initiate plea bargaining.190
The Armstrong Court further explained that prosecutors are accorded a
presumption of regularity because “the Attorney General and United States
Attorneys retain ‘broad discretion’ to enforce the Nation’s criminal laws”
under Article II, Section Three.191 As a result, a “selective-prosecution claim
asks a court to exercise judicial power over a ‘special province’ of the
Executive.”192 But there is no “special province” of law enforcement. In fact,
“[u]nlike prosecutors, [law enforcement] agents regularly testify in criminal
cases, and their credibility may be relentlessly attacked by defense
counsel.”193 The right to cross-examine a witness, guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, is broad. 194 Moreover, “[s]tatements that agents make in
affidavits for search or arrest warrants may be contested, and the court may
need their testimony to decide whether if shorn of untruthful statements the
affidavits would have established probable cause.”195
In the civil context, law enforcement officers are not afforded the same
presumption of constitutionality as prosecutors. While prosecutors ordinarily
are shielded by absolute immunity for their prosecutorial acts, 196 police
189

272 U.S. 1, 13–15 (1926).
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)).
191
Id. (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
192
Id. (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)).
193
United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc); see also id. (“They also may
have to testify in pretrial proceedings, such as hearings on motions to suppress evidence, and again their
honesty is open to challenge.”).
194
See United States v. Lankford, 955 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting it is well established
that “[t]he right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment includes the right of crossexamination”); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (“[T]he cross-examiner is not only permitted
to delve into the witness’ story to test the witness’ perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has
traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.”).
195
Davis, 793 F.3d at 720 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)).
196
See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–71 (1993); id. at 273 (“[A]cts undertaken by a
prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course
of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.”); Forrester
v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225–26 (1988) (stating that absolute immunity extends to “Executive Branch
officials who . . . perform prosecutorial functions that are ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase
of the criminal process’” (citation omitted)). Even prosecutors, however, are not immune from liability
190
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officers and federal agents enjoy no such categorical protection. Rather, law
enforcement officers receive only “qualified immunity” for personal liability
in the performance of their duties.197 Law enforcement officers may be held
personally liable for “withholding evidence from prosecutors and thus
causing violations of the constitutional requirement that defendants have
access to material, exculpatory evidence.” 198 When a police officer does
arrest a person without probable cause, the officer may be liable in a civil
rights suit for damages.199 As the Third Circuit explained forty years before
Washington, “[t]he special considerations which lead us to grant absolute
immunity to a prosecutor’s decision to initiate and present a criminal action
are simply not present when a federal law enforcement officer is charged
with constitutional violations.”200
To the extent that any special considerations support deference to law
enforcement, those considerations carry the least weight when a law
enforcement policy is challenged. This is especially relevant in the stash
house context, as such operations appear across the United States not because
of “some kind of convergent law-enforcement evolution, but instead . . . due
to the promulgation of official policies by a federal agency.”201 There is no
qualified immunity for suits brought against entities, such as counties or state
police agencies, when the alleged violation is an entity-wide policy. 202
Nor do Armstrong’s other justifications for deference apply to law
enforcement. Armstrong found that deference to prosecutors’ decisions
“rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors and
for actions taken in an investigatory capacity. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 (“When a prosecutor performs
the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is neither appropriate
nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)).
197
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Professor William Baude recently called into
question whether such qualified immunity has a constitutional basis. See generally William Baude, Is
Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 (2018) (arguing that the doctrine of qualified
immunity is unlawful and inconsistent with principles of statutory interpretation).
198
Davis, 793 F.3d at 720; see also Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 381 (6th Cir. 2009)
(recognizing that “virtually every other circuit has concluded either that the police share in the state’s
obligations under Brady, or that the Constitution imposes on the police obligations analogous to those
recognized in Brady”).
199
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555–57 (1967); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
200
Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1216 (3d Cir. 1979).
201
United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 220 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The ATF reverse sting model is
familiar to us and other courts precisely because it is a defined operation, one with policies, manuals,
targeting criteria, and standards.”).
202
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993)
(“[U]nlike various government officials, municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit—either absolute
or qualified—under § 1983.”).
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courts,” which is “‘not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts
are competent to undertake.’” 203 But courts see thousands of civil suits
against police officers each year. 204 While courts have historically been
hesitant to review decisions of prosecutors,205 no such hesitance exists for
police officers. To the contrary, when a person is arrested without a warrant,
courts are actually required to review the police officer’s discretionary
decision.206 Thus, courts commonly inquire into the arrest process and any
procedures the officer may or may not have followed.
Justice Neil Gorsuch recently recognized these distinctions in his
concurrence in Nieves v. Bartlett, explaining that “enough questions remain
about Armstrong’s potential application [to the law enforcement context]
that I hesitate to speak definitively about it today.” 207 In support, Justice
Gorsuch cited the three courts of appeals cases discussed above and
summarized their conclusion that “the presumptions of regularity and
immunity that usually attach to official prosecutorial decisions do not apply
equally in the less formal setting of police arrests.”208
Finally, Armstrong found that deference to prosecutors’ charging
decisions “also stems from a concern not to unnecessarily impair the
performance of a core executive constitutional function,” which may “chill
law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking
to outside inquiry.”209 But law enforcement officers do not have the same
type of “core executive function” to which the Court refers. Prosecutors
decide when the law should be enforced, and the judiciary is loath to evaluate

203
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.
598, 607 (1985)).
204
Section 1983 suits are routinely brought against police officers in their individual capacity. For
example, data collected in New York City from 2015 to 2018 suggest that at least 152 lawsuits have been
filed against police officers for violations of the Equal Protection Clause alone. See Legal Aid Soc’y,
Lawsuits Against New York City Police Officers, CAPSTAT, https://www.capstat.nyc/lawsuits/?charge_
group__value=&charge_outcomes__value=&causes_of_action__value=Violation+of+Equal+Protection
+Clause&tags__value=&force_details__value=&stop_location__value=&county__value=&incident_da
te=&plaintiff_race__value=&plaintiff_gender__value=&settlement_amount=&outcome=&sort=settlement_amount [https://perma.cc/R3RW-RGSD].
205
See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965).
206
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
207
139 S. Ct. 1715, 1733 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
208
Id. at 1733–34 (first citing United States v. Sellers, 906 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2018); then citing
United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 219 (3d Cir. 2017); and then citing United States v. Davis,
793 F.3d 712, 720–21 (7th Cir. 2015)).
209
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.
598, 607 (1985)).
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those decisions due to separation of powers concerns. 210 No separation of
powers concern exists in the law enforcement context. 211 Moreover, any
chilling effect a lower discovery standard might have on law enforcement
will be tempered by an important practical limit: for defendants to bring a
successful selective law enforcement claim, they would need to be arrested
for a particular crime—such as crack distribution—or as part of a specific
law enforcement operation—such as a sting operation or drug-interdiction
checkpoint. They would also need to demonstrate that law enforcement had
arrested a selected group whose racial composition is different from that of
the general population (or some other benchmark group). And determining
the contours of that selected group presents its own challenges.212
At the end of the day, the time is right to “chill law enforcement” by
subjecting the police officer’s “motives and decisionmaking to outside
inquiry.”213 It is both morally and legally troubling that the police can run
operations that almost exclusively target people of color. Discovery is the
only mechanism a defendant has to start the process of holding law
enforcement accountable. Departing from Armstrong is thus an important
step toward equal justice for all.
The second reason courts should adopt a lower discovery standard for
selective law enforcement claims is that Armstrong’s similarly situated
requirement is unreasonable in the law enforcement context. It is impossible
to identify a particular white individual whom the police did not target or
investigate because it is impossible to prove a negative. Identifying similarly
situated individuals is “especially difficult in policing cases: police keep no
‘records of instances in which they could have stopped a motorist . . . but did
not.’”214 Even if the defendant uses statistics, Armstrong’s similarly situated

210
See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973) (“The
primary ground upon which this traditional judicial aversion to compelling prosecutions has been based
is the separation of powers doctrine.”); Cox, 342 F.2d at 171 (“[A]s an officer of the executive department
[a U.S. Attorney] exercises a discretion as to whether or not there shall be a prosecution in a particular
case. It follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to interfere
with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control
over criminal prosecutions.” (citation omitted)). But see KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 210 (1979) (“If separation of powers prevents review of discretion of
executive officers, then more than a hundred Supreme Court decisions spread over a century and threequarters will have to be found contrary to the Constitution!”).
211
See supra notes 201–204 and accompanying text.
212
See infra note 301.
213
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607).
214
Sonja B. Starr, Testing Racial Profiling: Empirical Assessment of Disparate Treatment by Police,
2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 485, 492 n.29 (quoting Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U.
MIA. L. REV. 425, 438 (1997)).
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requirement would require a defendant at the discovery stage to identify
white individuals who met the law enforcement agency’s selection criteria,
but whom police did not target. Yet, without the law enforcement agency’s
criteria—often the very object of the defendant’s motion for discovery—this
is impossible. It is unsurprising that “[m]ost—though not all—judges have
denied defendants’ [selective law enforcement discovery] motions on the
grounds that they could not prove that ‘similarly situated’ whites were not
targeted.”215
Courts recognize Armstrong’s ill fit in the selective law enforcement
context. As one New Jersey appellate court explained, “In most instances, a
claim of selective [law] enforcement cannot be proven without discovery of
police records, which show enforcement patterns during a period of time in
a given geographical location. These records are usually within the exclusive
control of the police agency.”216 The Fourth Circuit observed that “[i]n the
stash house sting context, a defendant . . . face[s] considerable difficulty
obtaining credible evidence of similarly situated individuals who were not
investigated by ATF.” 217 Justice Gorsuch recently recognized the Third,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits’ reasoning that “comparative data about
similarly situated individuals may be less readily available for arrests than
for prosecutorial decisions, and that other kinds of evidence—such as an
officer’s questions and comments to the defendant—may be equally if not
more probative in the arrest context.”218
The third reason the discovery standard for selective law enforcement
claims should be lowered is to allow courts to adjudicate police
discrimination claims on the merits. For example, the new standard set in
Davis enabled Professor Siegler and her Federal Criminal Justice Clinic to
obtain discovery about the ATF’s selection criteria for its Chicago stash
house operations and the racial composition of the selected group—the
ninety-four defendants targeted in stash house operations in Chicago from
2006 to 2013219—as well as extensive criminal history data to determine the

215

Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 165, at 1190.
State v. Halsey, 774 A.2d 693, 699 (N.J. App. Div. 2001).
217
United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 101 (4th Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Lopez, 415 F.
Supp. 3d 422, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
218
Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1733–34 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing United
States v. Sellers, 906 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2018); then citing United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d
193, 219 (3d Cir. 2017); and then citing United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 720–21 (7th Cir. 2015)).
219
See Motion to Dismiss for Racially Selective Law Enforcement at 9–10, United States v. Brown,
299 F. Supp. 3d 976 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 12-CR-0632-RC), ECF No. 518.
216
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universe of individuals who met the ATF’s selection criteria.220 Armed with
this information, the Clinic retained Professor Jeffrey Fagan to produce an
expert report. Professor Fagan used the ATF’s selection criteria and the
criminal history data obtained in litigation against the Illinois State Police to
identify a benchmark group, identifying 292,442 individuals who met the
ATF’s selection criteria but were not pursued for fake stash house
operations. 221 Fagan then used several statistical analyses to compare the
racial composition of the benchmark group (72.2% nonwhite; 55.4% Black)
with the racial composition of the selected group (91.5% nonwhite; 78.7%
Black). 222 Fagan concluded: “The results of several empirical analyses
converge to show a pattern of discrimination by defendant race and ethnicity
in the targeting of Black and Hispanic persons for fictitious Stash House
stings.”223
Based on Fagan’s report, the Clinic litigated the issue on the merits,
filing motions to dismiss for racially selective law enforcement on behalf of
forty-three indigent federal criminal defendants charged in twelve fake stash
house cases in Chicago, including Leslie Mayfield.224 The nine federal judges
presiding over the cases held an unprecedented joint evidentiary hearing on
the defendants’ motions to dismiss.225 In the wake of that hearing, the United
States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois made highly
unusual plea offers, offering to dismiss all of the mandatory-minimum gun
and drug charges.226 Many of the forty-three defendants who were originally
facing fifteen to thirty-five years in prison received time-served sentences
and were released. 227 None of this would have happened if the Seventh
Circuit had strictly applied Armstrong’s discovery standard in Davis.
220

See Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 992 (“The government estimates that as a result of the Court’s
orders, more than 5,000 pages of [discovery] materials have been disclosed.”). In addition, Professor
Siegler obtained state-level criminal history data that included race in a separate proceeding. Id. (“To
assist Professor Fagan in obtaining the data necessary to conduct his analysis, the Court presided over
protracted third-party subpoena proceedings involving the Illinois State Police[, resulting in] an extensive
amount of crime data being turned over . . . .” (citations omitted)).
221
See Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., supra note 9, at 5–6, 20.
222
Id. at 17 tbl.3.1, 18 tbl.3.2, 22.
223
Id. at 36.
224
See United States v. Paxton, No. 13-CR-0103, 2018 WL 4504160, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2018)
(describing the motions to dismiss filed in the twelve criminal cases “after extensive discovery, expert
analysis and a unique hearing before the nine judges from this district who had false stash house cases on
their calendars”); Motion to Dismiss for Racially Selective Law Enforcement, supra note 219, at 25
(arguing that “[t]he Fagan Report’s statistical analyses create a strong inference that the ATF intentionally
targeted racial minorities”).
225
Paxton, 2018 WL 4504160, at *1; see also Meisner, supra note 4.
226
Meisner, supra note 4.
227
See id.; Sweeney & Meisner, supra note 3.
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The bottom line is that Armstrong is a bad fit for the selective law
enforcement context—both doctrinally, as the underlying rationales do not
apply, and functionally, because in practice the similarly situated
requirement is impossible to meet. Moreover, the discovery standard
matters. Relaxing that standard enables judges to evaluate meritorious
claims, which in turn can lead prosecutors to reassess whether to move
forward with prosecution.228 Courts should therefore revisit their discovery
standards for selective law enforcement claims and depart from Armstrong.
III. STATE-LEVEL REFORM
Federal courts are only part of the story. Most law enforcement
interactions involve local police,229 and about 87% of all prisoners are held
in state systems. 230 While Davis, Washington, and Sellers took important
strides toward full enforcement of equal protection rights on the federal level,
state courts still apply Armstrong’s insurmountable discovery standard to
selective law enforcement claims. As a result, Armstrong often thwarts state
defendants seeking selective law enforcement discovery, either under the
federal Equal Protection Clause or a state constitutional equivalent.
A state-level solution is needed to ensure that meritorious equal
protection claims are not blocked by Armstrong’s impossible discovery
standard. Too often, efforts to address discrimination by police focus
exclusively on federal-level reforms. Reformers and scholars tend to forget
that the United States has a system of dual constitutionalism, where both the
federal Constitution and state constitutions protect individual rights. 231 As
Justice William Brennan observed in a famous article, “State
constitutions . . . are a font of individual liberties, their protections often

228

In addition to the Chicago stash house litigation, after a federal district court in San Francisco
granted discovery in support of a selective law enforcement claim, United States v. Mumphrey, 193 F.
Supp. 3d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2016), the government dismissed the cases against thirty-seven defendants
arrested as part of an ATF drug sting operation, Notice of Dismissal, Mumphrey, No. 14-CR-0643-EMC
(N.D. Cal. Jan 25, 2017), ECF No. 293 (order approving government’s notice of dismissal with
prejudice).
229
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, NATIONAL SOURCES OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYMENT DATA 2 & tbl.1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TM48-4HP4] (estimating 1,076,054 full-time state and local law enforcement officers
in 2012).
230
JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 13 (2017).
231
G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1 (1998) (“Americans live under a
system of dual constitutionalism, but one would hardly know it.”).
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extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
federal law.”232
Section III.A traces state courts’ adoption of Armstrong’s discovery
standard for both selective prosecution and law enforcement claims. Section
III.B identifies recent state-level reforms in other contexts that are more
protective of criminal defendants’ rights than the federal Constitution. In
particular, it looks to state court rules, state statutes, and reinterpretations of
state constitutional provisions. It further explains how each of these
mechanisms is a potential vehicle for reforming the discovery standard for
selective law enforcement claims brought in state courts, setting the stage for
Part IV to ultimately propose a new state court rule.
A. Armstrong on the State Level
State courts have generally applied Armstrong’s discovery standard to
both selective prosecution and selective law enforcement claims brought
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts in California, 233 New Jersey, 234
Colorado, 235 Washington, 236 and Pennsylvania 237 all do so. As one
Pennsylvania court explained, “in cases of alleged selective enforcement,” a
party “needs to produce evidence ‘tending to show the existence of the
essential elements of the defense, discriminatory effect and discriminatory
intent.’” 238 Pennsylvania, like other states, roots this standard in

232
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 491 (1977).
233
People v. Sanchez-Esceverre, No. C065460, 2011 WL 5138080, at *1, *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31,
2011) (applying Armstrong’s “some evidence” standard to a claim that Hispanic drivers were singled out
for enforcement of traffic laws). In fact, California’s discovery rules “prohibit[] any discovery in a
criminal case which is not expressly mandated by statute or required by the U.S. Constitution.” People v.
Superior Ct. (Baez), 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706, 714 (Ct. App. 2000); see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054(e),
1054.5(a).
234
State v. Ballard, 752 A.2d 735, 742 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (holding that although the
lower court applied a slightly different standard for discovery, the court “doubt[ed] that the two tests
[New Jersey and Armstrong] are substantially different”).
235
People v. Valencia-Alvarez, 101 P.3d 1112, 1116 (Colo. App. 2004) (“To obtain discovery on
this issue, the defendant need not establish a prima facie case of selective enforcement. The defendant
must, however, provide some evidence tending to show the existence of both discriminatory effect and
discriminatory intent.” (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996))).
236
State v. Johnson, No. 52123-3-I, 2005 WL 353314, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing that
“[t]he Armstrong decision was in the context of selective prosecution, not selective enforcement” but
ultimately concluding that for discovery purposes “the requirement for a determination of who is similarly
situated used for selective prosecution claims should be applied here”).
237
KC Equities v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 95 A.3d 918, 934 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014).
238
Id. (quoting Koken v. One Beacon Ins. Co., 911 A.2d 1021, 1031 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006)).
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Armstrong. 239 No state court has yet recognized the distinction the three
federal courts of appeals have drawn between selective prosecution and
selective law enforcement.
Only Arizona has independently considered the discovery standard for
selective law enforcement claims under its own constitution and adopted
Armstrong. In Jones v. Sterling, the Arizona Supreme Court extended
Armstrong’s discovery standard to selective law enforcement claims when
interpreting a provision of Arizona’s constitution mirroring Article II’s
executive power provisions. 240 The defendants asserted that police
conducting traffic stops had engaged in racially selective law enforcement,
requested discovery, and moved for appointment of an expert witness under
Arizona’s discovery rules. 241 The expert appointment issue turned on
whether the defendants had met their burden for obtaining discovery.242
Although the court was not bound to follow Armstrong, it nevertheless
drew parallels between the Arizona constitution and the United States
Constitution and extended Armstrong’s discovery standard to selective law
enforcement claims. The court concluded that the policy reasons animating
Armstrong were also present in the selective law enforcement context,
explaining that the “Arizona Constitution, like its federal counterpart,
charges the executive branch with the duty to ensure that the ‘laws be
faithfully executed.’” 243 As a result, the court imposed Armstrong’s
“demanding standard” on the defendants.244
B. State Law Reforms
Our federalist system allows for states to protect individual rights to a
greater degree than the federal government. Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution define a
constitutional minimum of protection; that is, they set the federal floor. But
these decisions do not prevent states from setting higher standards for
combatting discrimination. In recent years, states have enacted legislation,
passed criminal rules of procedure, or interpreted their own constitutions to
provide more protections to criminal defendants than the federal
239

The case the court quoted in laying out the standard for selective law enforcement cases cites
Armstrong. See Koken, 911 A.2d at 1031. Additionally, the opinion clearly lays out the distinction
between selective enforcement and selective prosecution claims. See KC Equities, 95 A.3d at 934.
240
110 P.3d 1271, 1278–79 (Ariz. 2005) (en banc).
241
Id. at 1272–73. Jones was African American, while Rodriguez-Burgos and Rodriguez were
Latino. Id. at 1272. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.9(a) enables indigent defendants to apply for
funding for experts.
242
Id. at 1279.
243
Id. at 1278 (comparing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 with ARIZ. CONST. art. 5, § 4).
244
Id. at 1278–79.
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Constitution. For example, states have enacted new rules to combat racial
discrimination in jury selection and enlarge prosecutors’ obligation to
disclose exculpatory evidence. This Section discusses those reforms and
suggests how the same mechanisms could be used to create new state-level
discovery standards for racially selective law enforcement claims.
1. State Court Rules
Most state courts’ rulemaking authority allows them to promulgate
rules governing their practices and procedures. The source of courts’
authority varies from state to state and often comes from state statutes, state
constitutions, or a court’s inherent authority. 245 State court rules cover a
broad range of areas, from court interpreters to access to records to security
to jury selection. Recently, some states have achieved criminal justice
reforms using state court rules. For example, Washington adopted a state
court rule that extends protections against discrimination in jury selection,
and several state courts have promulgated rules that expand a prosecutor’s
required discovery disclosures. These new rules provide a valuable model
for setting a new discovery standard for selective law enforcement claims.
A recent rule adopted by the Washington Supreme Court to combat race
discrimination in jury selection demonstrates how reform can be enacted
through state court rules. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court set a
high “purposeful discrimination” standard for race-based jury selection
claims. 246 Batson’s purposeful discrimination requirement is analogous to
Armstrong’s discriminatory-intent requirement, as both expect the defendant
to provide difficult-to-procure evidence of intentional discrimination. Batson
has been widely criticized for providing scant protection to defendants
seeking to challenge racial discrimination in jury selection. 247 Like
Armstrong, Batson is insurmountable for many defendants.248
245
See CHRISTOPHER REINHART & GEORGE COPPOLO, CONN. OFF. OF LEGIS. RSCH., COURT RULES
OTHER STATES-LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL, at tbl.1 (2008), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R0430.htm [https://perma.cc/K3RR-SXLK].
246
476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986).
247
See Jonathan Abel, Batson’s Appellate Appeal and Trial Tribulations, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 713,
716–26 (2018) (summarizing critiques).
248
See Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the
Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1092 (2011)
(examining 269 federal civil and criminal Batson decisions over a nine-year period and finding that relief
in the form of a new trial was granted in fewer than 7% of the cases and that in “85.1% [of the] cases, the
court rejected the Batson claim altogether”); EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 4 (2010), https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/
illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG4A-Z9HT] (presenting two years
of research in eight southern states that “uncovered shocking evidence of racial discrimination in jury
selection”).
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The Washington Supreme Court recognized Batson’s unworkability,
concluding that “[t]wenty-six years later it is evident that Batson . . . is
failing us.” 249 The court cited a growing body of evidence showing that
“Batson has done very little to make juries more diverse or prevent
prosecutors from exercising race-based challenges.” 250 In response, the
Washington Supreme Court assembled a working group to formulate a new
state court rule to rectify Batson’s shortcomings. The working group
included defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and practitioners who
agreed that “[t]he proposed rule should not simply codify Batson and its
progeny.”251
Eventually, the Washington Supreme Court adopted General Rule 37,
which provides additional protections against discrimination in jury
selection.252 The rule replaces Batson’s “purposeful discrimination” standard
with an “objective observer” test, stating that the judge should grant the
objection if “an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor”
in the peremptory strike, even if the court does not find that “purposeful
discrimination” is afoot.253 The rule further defines an “objective observer”
as someone who “is aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious
biases, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair
exclusion of potential jurors.”254 Additionally, the rule lists presumptively
invalid reasons for a peremptory challenge. This list includes the many
purportedly race-neutral reasons that typically shield prosecutors’ strikes of
prospective jurors, like prior contact with law enforcement, distrust of law
249
State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 334 (Wash. 2013) (plurality opinion) (citing Miller-El v. Dretke,
545 U.S. 231, 270 (2005)), abrogated on other grounds by City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124
(Wash. 2017).
250
Id. In Saintcalle, the court relied heavily on Justice Stephen Breyer’s concurring opinion in
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231. Justice Breyer explained that “studies and anecdotal reports suggest[]
that, despite Batson, the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges remains a problem.” Id. at 268
(Breyer, J., concurring) (collecting sources).
251
WASH. CT. JURY SELECTION WORKGROUP, PROPOSED NEW GR 37—JURY SELECTION
WORKGROUP FINAL REPORT 3 (2018) [hereinafter WORKGROUP FINAL REPORT],
https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20Orders/OrderNo25700-A1221Workgroup.pdf [https://perma.cc/LM44-LWLK]. Recall that state courts are not bound by the low
level of protection that Batson affords criminal defendants. Rather, because Batson is rooted in the Equal
Protection Clause, it defines a constitutional minimum of protection; that is, it sets the federal floor.
Nothing prevents states from combatting discrimination in jury selection more aggressively, whether
through court rules or legislation.
252
WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37. For an in-depth analysis of the rule, see Annie Sloan, Note, “What to Do
About Batson?”: Using a Court Rule to Address Implicit Bias in Jury Selection, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 233
(2020).
253
WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37(e).
254
Id. 37(f).
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enforcement, living in a high-crime neighborhood, not being a native English
speaker, and so on.255
Rule 37 also codifies the concept of comparative juror analysis.256 The
Supreme Court and lower courts have held that it is evidence of purposeful
discrimination if a prosecutor’s reason for a given peremptory strike applies
equally to an otherwise similarly situated juror of another race or gender who
was not struck from the jury.257 Yet, unlike several state and federal courts,258
the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that comparative juror analysis
is sufficient to prove a Batson violation. Rule 37 moves the law forward by
codifying the varieties of comparative juror analysis that can lead to the
conclusion that discrimination is afoot.
Other state supreme courts have also begun to explore whether to adopt
a similar rule to address Batson’s many shortcomings. Recently, the Supreme
Court of California convened a work group to consider whether its current
standard for peremptory strikes is sufficient to eliminate discrimination.259
Connecticut and North Carolina have similarly formed work groups to study
racial bias in jury selection.260
In the discovery context, state courts have expanded criminal
defendants’ right to obtain exculpatory evidence beyond the federal
constitutional standard set in Brady v. Maryland.261 Brady doctrine imposes
an onerous requirement that defendants establish “materiality”: prosecutors
are only required to disclose exculpatory evidence if the defendant
255

Id. 37(h).
Id. 37(g). “When a court undertakes comparative juror analysis, it engages in a comparison
between, on the one hand, a challenged panelist, and on the other hand, similarly situated but
unchallenged panelists who are not members of the challenged panelist’s protected group.” People v.
Gutierrez, 395 P.3d 186, 201 (Cal. 2017).
257
See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1741 (2016) (finding impermissible discrimination when
a prosecutor struck a Black juror because she was “too young” and “divorced” yet allowed white jurors
to remain who were younger and also divorced); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 261–63 (2005)
(finding a prosecutor’s practice of seating white people but striking Black people who held identical
opinions about the minimum sentence for murder was discriminatory).
258
See, e.g., Gutierrez, 395 P.3d at 203; People v. Beauvais, 393 P.3d 509, 512 (Colo. 2017); People
v. Sánchez, 375 P.3d 812, 874–75 (Cal. 2016) (Liu, J., concurring) (collecting state cases from Illinois,
New York, and Alabama, as well as cases from six federal courts of appeals).
259
Supreme Court Announces Jury Selection Work Group, CAL. CTS. NEWSROOM (Jan. 29, 2020),
https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/internal_redirect/cms.ipressroom.com.s3.amazonaws.com/262/files/202
00/SupCt20200129.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UBT-CXHP].
260
Beth Schwartzapfel, A Growing Number of State Courts Are Confronting Unconscious Racism
in
Jury
Selection,
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(May
11,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/11/a-growing-number-of-state-courts-are-confrontingunconscious-racism-in-jury-selection [https://perma.cc/S4T2-CZ7D].
261
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
256
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establishes that the evidence has a “reasonable probability” of affecting the
outcome of the trial or sentencing.262 Justice Thurgood Marshall critiqued the
materiality prong as “enabl[ing] prosecutors to avoid disclosing obviously
exculpatory evidence” by deeming that evidence nonmaterial. 263 The
materiality prong means that only the most egregious failures to disclose
evidence lead to reversal on appeal. 264 Like the standards in Batson and
Armstrong, Brady’s materiality requirement is too demanding to provide any
meaningful protection for defendants and bars otherwise meritorious
claims.265
Recently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s Criminal Procedural
Rules Committee published notice of a proposed amendment that seeks to
remove the demanding “materiality” requirement. 266 The amendment
explains:
[The exculpatory evidence rule] was amended in 2019 to remove the provision
of “materiality” from the requirement of mandatory disclosure by the
prosecution of information favorable to the defense. While originally intended
to convey the idea that the information was relevant to the case at issue, the

262
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (holding that, regardless of request, favorable
evidence is material and must be disclosed “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different”); accord Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433–44 (1995).
263
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 700 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that a materiality standard means
“there is no constitutional duty to disclose evidence unless nondisclosure would have a certain impact on
the trial[,] . . . permit[ting] prosecutors to withhold with impunity large amounts of undeniably favorable
evidence”).
264
See Christopher Deal, Note, Brady Materiality Before Trial: The Scope of the Duty to Disclose
and the Right to a Trial by Jury, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1780, 1793 n.77 (2007) (“With Brady, prosecutors
have no mandatory procedure to follow or neutral observer to placate. They are not duty-bound to serve
the interests of the defendant. Instead, they can withhold nonmaterial evidence for any or no reason; and
the guiltier the defendant seems, the more evidence they can withhold.”).
265
See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1543
(2010) (“When Brady issues do come to light, the materiality test is a heavy burden for a defendant to
overcome on appeal.”); Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat
of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 432 (2001) (discussing a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette study that “found
that prosecutors intentionally withheld evidence in hundreds of cases during the past decade, but that
courts overturned verdicts in only the most extreme cases”); Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and
Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 647 (2002)
(describing the Supreme Court’s increasingly narrow reading of “materiality” as a significant hurdle for
defendants).
266
SUP. CT. OF PA. CRIM. PROCEDURAL RULES COMM., NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING:
PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF PA. R. CRIM. P. 573, at 1–2 (2019), https://www.
pacourts.us/assets/uploads/Resources/Documents/Publication%20Report%20Rule%20573%20Mandato
ry%20Disclosure%20In%20Discovery%20-%20008207.pdf?cb=534af [https://perma.cc/5NUB-4JWB].
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term had become more narrowly defined in practice and used as an obstacle for
disclosure.267

The proposed amendment thus aligns itself with ABA Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.8(d) and various state court ethical rules that likewise
eliminate the materiality component and require disclosure of all favorable
evidence regardless of its effect on the outcome of the case.268
Similarly, Alaska269 and Hawaii270 have state court rules that appear to
remove or modify the “materiality” requirement. A number of federal district
courts have local rules that explicitly require disclosure of favorable
evidence “without regard to materiality.”271
State courts could institute similar rules to codify the new racially
selective law enforcement discovery standard established by the federal
courts of appeals. State courts could go even further and devise a system that
authorizes the appointment of experts to assist defendants in establishing
their selective law enforcement claim. Part IV more fully explores this
possibility by proposing a new state court rule.

267

Id. at 8.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); TENN. SUP. CT. R.
8; In re Larsen, 379 P.3d 1209 (Utah 2016); In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202 (D.C. 2015); VA. STANDING
COMM. ON LEGAL ETHICS, LEGAL ETHICS OPINION 1862: “TIMELY DISCLOSURE” OF EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE AND DUTIES TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION IN PLEA NEGOTIATIONS 2 (2012) (opinion of
Virginia Legal Ethics Committee); In re Disciplinary Action Against Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672, 678 (N.D.
2012); In re Jordan, 913 So. 2d 775 (La. 2005).
269
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(3) (requiring prosecutors to disclose “information . . . which tends to
negate the guilt of the accused . . . or would tend to reduce the accused’s punishment” without reference
to materiality). Interpreting this rule, Alaska courts have articulated a relatively lower requirement for
disclosure than Brady. When evidence “was known to the prosecution and subject to discovery under
Criminal Rule 16 but not disclosed, the defendant[] . . . need only show that the ‘undisclosed evidence
might have affected the judgment of the jury or the outcome of the trial.’” Roseman v. State, No. A-659,
1985 WL 1078004, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 26, 1985) (quoting Maloney v. State, 667 P.2d 1258,
1264–65 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983)).
270
Hawaii Rule of Penal Procedure 16(b)(1)(vii), which governs the disclosure of exculpatory
evidence in felony cases, does not contain a materiality requirement on its face. Cf. HAW. R. PENAL P.
(16)(d) (providing discovery in misdemeanor cases only “[u]pon a showing of materiality”). The explicit
inclusion of a materiality requirement in misdemeanor cases suggests that the court intentionally omitted
any materiality requirement for the disclosure of favorable evidence in felony cases. See State v.
Townsend, 784 P.2d 881, 883–84 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989) (“[I]n a case involving a felony, Rule 16
discovery is automatically available to the parties as a matter of right. However, the parties in a
misdemeanor case may resort to discovery only by grace of the court’s discretion, upon a showing of
materiality and reasonableness.”).
271
LAURAL HOOPER, DAVID RAUMA, MARIE LEARY & SHELIA THORPE, A SUMMARY OF
RESPONSES TO A NATIONAL SURVEY OF RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
DISCLOSURE
PRACTICES
IN
CRIMINAL
CASES
12
&
n.32
(2011),
https://www.uscourts.gov/file/17996/download [https://perma.cc/KSY6-Q5BF].
268
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2. State Statutes
State statutes provide another vehicle for reform. In both the civil and
criminal contexts, state legislatures commonly determine the scope and
duties of the discovery process, such as the default number or length of
depositions, the scope of discovery, or procedures for electronically stored
evidence. 272 Overall, most states’ discovery statutes tend to be more
expansive than the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.273 All states except
Delaware, Indiana, and Nevada have statewide criminal discovery rules,
promulgated either legislatively or judicially.274
Texas’s Michael Morton Act is one recent example of criminal justice
reform accomplished through a legislative change in discovery standards.
Texas passed the Michael Morton Act275 in 2013 in response to a series of
high-profile instances of prosecutorial misconduct, later rectified by
exonerations.276 The Act radically changed criminal discovery in Texas by
creating an open-file policy, which obviates the need for defense counsel to
continually request discovery and eliminates delays in discovery
production.277 The Act also attempted to relax the standard for disclosure of
exculpatory evidence by rejecting Brady’s prohibitive “materiality”
standard, just as the courts of appeals broke with Armstrong. 278 The rule

272
See, e.g., S.B. 224, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., at 7, 9, 13, 18 (Mo. 2019) (limiting
interrogatories, providing additional procedures for privileged materials, clarifying that electronically
stored evidence is discoverable, and imposing time limitation on depositions); M E. R. UNIFIED CRIM. P.
16(a)(1)–(2) (establishing automatic disclosure of evidence by prosecutors in criminal cases).
273
Emily Dyer, Chelsea Stacey & Adrian Viesca, Statewide Rules of Criminal Procedure: A 50 State
Review, 1 NEV. L.J.F. 1, 23 (2017); see also Baer, supra note 98, at 3 (“State legislatures are increasingly
adopting more generous discovery regimes, many of which impose earlier and more rigorous disclosure
requirements on prosecutors.”).
274
See Dyer et al., supra note 273, at 23 & n.157.
275
Michael Morton Act, ch. 49, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 83d Reg. Sess. 106 (codified as an amendment
to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2014)). In 2012, a federal exculpatory evidence bill
that would have eliminated the materiality requirement was proposed in the United States Congress but
died in committee. See Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act, S. 2197, 112th Cong. § 3014 (2012).
276
See TEX. APPLESEED & TEX. DEF. SERV., TOWARDS MORE TRANSPARENT JUSTICE: THE
MICHAEL MORTON ACT’S FIRST YEAR 1–7 (2015) [hereinafter TOWARDS MORE TRANSPARENT
JUSTICE], https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/2015MortonAct-FinalReport.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YK9E-WYGC].
277
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14; Riley E. Clafton, Note, A Material Change to
Brady: Rethinking Brady v. Maryland, Materiality, and Criminal Discovery, 110 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 307, 340–47 (2020).
278
See S. COMM. ON CRIM. JUST., BILL ANALYSIS, S. 590-1611, 83d Reg. Sess., at 1 (Tex. 2013),
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/83R/analysis/pdf/SB01611S.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BVS2-DNBD]
(“Every defendant should have access to all the evidence relevant to his guilt or innocence, with adequate
time to examine it.”); TOWARDS MORE TRANSPARENT JUSTICE, supra note 276, at 22 (“Under the Act,
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requires automatic disclosure of all “exculpatory, impeachment, or
mitigating” evidence that “tend[s] to reduce the punishment for the offense
charged.”279 Texas courts, however, have ignored the Act’s clear design and
gutted this provision by clinging to older language in the statute that uses the
word “material” in a wholly different context.280
Many other state legislatures have deviated from Brady and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure by requiring that prosecutors automatically turn
over a broader category of relevant evidence to defendants.281 The Minnesota
and North Carolina legislatures have enacted the most expansive open-file
discovery statutes in the country.282
In this vein, state legislatures could pass a new discovery standard for
selective law enforcement claims that is not bound by Armstrong. Notably,
before addressing the constitutional question, Armstrong held that Rule 16
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not apply to discovery in
support of a racially selective prosecution claim.283 A state legislature could
similarly sidestep the constitutional question altogether by creating a state
rule of criminal procedure codifying a discovery standard for disclosing
evidence about race discrimination by the police.

information must be disclosed without any materiality analysis or anticipation of its impact on the case’s
outcome.”).
279
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(h).
280
Id. art. 39.14(a); see Watkins v. State, 554 S.W.3d 819, 821 (Tex. App. 2018) (“[T]he definition
or standard we must use to determine whether the objectionable evidence was material is the same after
the passage of the Michael Morton Act as it was before passage, regardless of what the Legislature may
have thought or intended to accomplish.” (emphasis added)); Clafton, supra note 277, at 344–47, 345
n.232 (collecting cases and prosecutors’ briefs advancing this position).
281
See Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery, 49 CONN. L. REV. 771, 779
(2017) (“About thirty states provide defendants with broader discovery than the federal rule by partially
or fully embracing these standards, which are more generous with respect to both witness lists and
witnesses’ prior statements.” (citation omitted)). New York, for example, recently overhauled its criminal
discovery statute, instituting an open-file system that requires prosecutors to automatically disclose a
wide variety of evidence and implementing timelines for disclosure. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 245.20
(McKinney 2020).
282
See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01 subd. 1 (requiring disclosure of “all matters within the prosecutor’s
possession or control that relate to the case”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(a)(1) (West 2016)
(requiring disclosure of the “complete files of all law enforcement agencies, investigatory agencies, and
prosecutors’ offices involved”); see also Grunwald, supra note 281, at 789–90 (examining Minnesota and
North Carolina’s expansive discovery rules). Nevertheless, courts in both states have read Brady’s high
materiality standard into their rules regarding disclosure of exculpatory evidence. See Pederson v. State,
692 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2005); State v. Dorman, 737 S.E.2d 452, 472 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
283
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996).
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3. State Constitutional Provisions
A third way states reform criminal discovery is by interpreting their
own constitutions to provide greater protection to defendants. Since state
constitutions work independently from the federal Constitution, states should
chart different paths than the Supreme Court. But state courts often lockstep,
imitating federal courts’ interpretations of federal constitutional provisions
when interpreting analogous state constitutional provisions. Lockstepping is
unwise and antifederalist. Instead, state courts should interpret their own
constitutions to forge a new discovery standard for racially selective law
enforcement claims.
The United States Constitution is often called a “federal floor of
individual rights.”284 While the “Supremacy Clause forbids state courts from
providing less protection than what the U.S. Constitution guarantees,”285 the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Constitution does not “limit the
authority of [any] State . . . to adopt in its own Constitution individual
liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.”286
As Sixth Circuit Judge Jeffrey Sutton remarked, “[S]tate guarantees may be
the most promising source of rights, [and] state courts the most promising
venue for vindicating them.” 287 In the context of an equal protection
challenge to school funding, Justice Marshall noted in dissent that “nothing
in the Court’s decision today should inhibit further review of state
educational funding schemes under state constitutional provisions.” 288
Similarly, in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has explained that its
constitutional holdings do “not affect the state’s power to impose higher
standards on searches and seizures than required by the federal Constitution

284
See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 106
(2014) (“The U.S. Constitution reflects the federal floor of individual rights because the Supremacy
Clause forbids state courts from providing less protection than what the U.S. Constitution guarantees.”);
Paul H. Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in the Land of 10,000 Lakes: Minnesota’s
Approach to Protecting Individual Rights Under Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions,
70 ALB. L. REV. 865, 875 (2007) (“All American citizens are guaranteed the protections of the United
States Constitution. This guarantee is sometimes described as the federal floor.”).
285
Douglas, supra note 284, at 106.
286
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); see also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714, 719 (1975) (“[A] State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police
activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards.” (emphasis
omitted)).
287
JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33 (2018).
288
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 133 n.100 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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if it chooses to do so.”289 And in his final majority opinion, Justice Antonin
Scalia underscored that “state courts may experiment all they want with their
own constitutions, and often do in the wake of this Court’s decisions.”290
Despite these precedents, state courts tend to look to federal case law
for guidance on interpreting analogous provisions of state constitutions.
State courts “lockstep” by “analyz[ing] the analogous rights in the state
constitution as conferring the same level of protection as their federal
counterparts,” diluting individual rights down to the federal floor.291 Judge
Sutton critiques this practice, arguing that state courts “diminish their
constitutions by interpreting them in reflexive imitation of the federal courts’
interpretation of the Federal Constitution”—a “grave threat to independent
state constitutions, and a key impediment to the role of state courts in
contributing to the dialogue of American constitutional law.” 292 Indeed,
lockstepping eviscerates the dual constitutional protection that citizens of
federal and state polities should enjoy.293
Historically, state courts have broken out of lockstep and departed from
the Supreme Court’s one-size-fits-all interpretation. For example, in
affirming the right to remain silent, the Supreme Court of California held
that prosecutors could not use pre-Miranda statements to impeach a
defendant who testifies, and “pause[ed] . . . to reaffirm the independent
nature of the California Constitution and [its] responsibility to separately
define and protect the rights of California citizens.” 294 In doing so, the
Supreme Court of California broke from federal precedent that allows
prosecutors to impeach a testifying defendant with pre-Miranda
statements.295
In the discovery context, at least two state supreme courts have
interpreted their state constitutions to set a lower materiality standard than
289

Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 118 (2016).
291
Douglas, supra note 284, at 106.
292
SUTTON, supra note 287, at 174; see also Goodwin Liu, Brennan Lecture, State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights: A Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1338 (2017) (“A state court
may recognize individual rights that go unrecognized by the Supreme Court because of textual or
historical considerations unique to that state or its constitution. . . . But there is nothing illegitimate about
a state court rejecting the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a parallel constitutional provision on grounds
that are not state-specific.”).
293
See Douglas, supra note 284, at 122 (“[L]ockstepping goes against the ideal of judicial federalism,
which suggests that state constitutions should play a significant role in protecting individual liberties.”);
see also Brennan, supra note 232, at 503 (“[O]ne of the strengths of our federal system is that it provides
a double source of protection for the rights of our citizens.”).
294
People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 280 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
295
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
290
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Brady. In State v. Shepherd, the New Hampshire Supreme Court explained:
“[O]ur constitutional analysis differs from that under the Federal
Constitution regarding when the defendant has the burden to prove
materiality.” 296 The court explained that under the New Hampshire
constitution, if the defendant proves that the prosecution knowingly withheld
“favorable, exculpatory evidence,” “there is a presumption that the evidence
is material and the burden shifts to the State to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt,” that the evidence is not material.297 The court justified this departure
by explaining that Brady’s standard “impose[s] too severe a burden upon the
defendant.” 298 New York’s highest court similarly broke with Brady long
before its legislature enacted sweeping discovery reform. 299 The court held
that, under the due process clause of the state constitution, evidence withheld
in the face of a specific discovery request is “material” as long as there is “a
‘reasonable possibility’ that the failure to disclose the exculpatory [evidence]
contributed to the verdict.”300
In the selective law enforcement context, states need not apply
Armstrong’s insurmountable discovery standard to claims brought under
analogous state constitutional equal protection provisions. 301 Many state
constitutions have equal protection clauses which can be interpreted to
provide more protection to criminal defendants than the federal
Constitution. 302 In one decision, Massachusetts’s highest court concluded
that “evidence of racial profiling is relevant in determining whether a traffic
stop is the product of selective [law] enforcement violative of the equal
protection guarantee of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.” 303 The
296

State v. Shepherd, 977 A.2d 1029, 1034 (N.H. 2009).
Id. at 1035 (quoting State v. Laurie, 653 A.2d 549, 552 (N.H. 1995)).
298
Id.
299
See supra note 281 for a summary of New York’s recent discovery reform.
300
People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 920–21 (N.Y. 1990) (explaining that the court was rejecting
the “reasonable probability” standard because “a backward-looking, outcome-oriented standard of review
that gives dispositive weight to the strength of the [prosecutor’s] case clearly provides diminished
incentive for the prosecutor . . . thoroughly to review files for exculpatory material, or to err on the side
of disclosure where exculpatory value is debatable”).
301
Of course, Armstrong did not address selective law enforcement claims, only selective
prosecution claims. Therefore, even under the federal Constitution, a state court could set a lower
discovery standard for selective law enforcement claims, as the Third and Ninth Circuits did.
302
See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 18 (“No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of
citizens or corporation, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to
all citizens or corporations.”); M.G.L.A. CONST. art. I, pt. I (Massachusetts) (“All men are born free and
equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right
of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property;
in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”).
303
Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 690 (Mass. 2008).
297
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court recognized that its holding “[did] not consider whether the same result
would be reached under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.”304
Similarly, states should not lockstep with Armstrong for selective law
enforcement discovery claims. Instead of blindly adopting Armstrong’s
standard, state courts should interpret their own state constitution’s equal
protection clause to authorize discovery under a standard akin to the Third
and Ninth Circuits’ standard. Such an approach is especially prudent given
the distinctions the federal courts of appeals have drawn between the
selective law enforcement context and the selective prosecution context in
Armstrong.
Under this approach, even cases like Jones v. Sterling could come out
differently. In Jones, the defendants brought a selective law enforcement
claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, not the Arizona constitution’s equal
protection provision, but sought discovery under Arizona’s discovery rules.
The Arizona Supreme Court adopted Armstrong, reasoning that the United
States Constitution and the Arizona constitution describe executive power
similarly. 305 Regardless, the court could have concluded that the
prosecutorial considerations underlying Armstrong do not translate into
Arizona’s separation of powers structure, perhaps recognizing that law
enforcement officers historically do not enjoy the same level of state
constitutional protection as prosecutors. If a state claim had been brought,
however, the court would have had an entirely clean slate to set its own
discovery standard for selective law enforcement claims. After all, states are
bound only by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and are free to interpret their own equal protection
provisions more expansively.306
Finally, because Armstrong did not address selective law enforcement
claims, states deciding such claims are not bound by any particular
interpretation. Even if a claim is brought under the Fourteenth Amendment,
a state court may be animated by different policy considerations that lead it
to reject Armstrong’s application to the selective law enforcement context,
including the very same considerations that spurred three federal courts of
appeals to depart from Armstrong.

304

Id. at 690 n.2.
Jones v. Sterling, 110 P.3d 1271, 1278 (Ariz. 2005) (en banc).
306
See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 817, 837–38 (1994); SUTTON, supra note 287, at 7–21, 173–78.
305
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Critics argue that lockstepping is good because it creates uniformity and
predictability in outcomes at the federal and state levels.307 But “[t]here is no
reason to think, as an interpretive matter, that constitutional guarantees of
independent sovereigns, even guarantees with the same or similar words,
must be construed in the same way.” 308 The considerations that nine Supreme
Court Justices must weigh when interpreting the United States Constitution
are distinct from each state’s constitutional considerations. From an
originalist perspective, the drafters’ intentions are likely to be different,
especially in newer states. 309 From a purposivist perspective, the social,
economic, and other contextual circumstances are similarly bound to
differ. 310 As a result, highly generalized guarantees in the federal
Constitution, such as the prohibition on “unreasonable” searches, do not
necessarily “have just one meaning over a range of differently situated
sovereigns.”311
Moreover, “[f]ederalism considerations may lead the U.S. Supreme
Court to underenforce (or at least not to overenforce) constitutional
guarantees in view of the number of people affected and the range of
jurisdictions implicated”—considerations to which states, as sovereigns,
should pay no attention.312 In the equal protection context, this concern rings
307
State v. Florance, 527 P.2d 1202, 1209 (Or. 1974) (explaining the importance of uniformity in
search-and-seizure law); People v. Gonzalez, 465 N.E.2d 823, 825 (N.Y. 1984) (same); see also Earl M.
Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995, 1006–23 (1985) (arguing that
expansive state court interpretations of individual rights result in unnecessary duplication and uncertainty
about the scope of such rights).
308
SUTTON, supra note 287, at 174.
309
See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 170 (2009) (rejecting
the idea that “interpretations of the federal Constitution can somehow authoritatively set the meaning for
similar provisions of state constitutions”); see also Jeremy M. Christiansen, Originalism: The Primary
Canon of State Constitutional Interpretation, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 341 (2017).
310
A classic example of this is differing treatment of riparian rights based on the location of the state.
In eastern states, where water is more plentiful, anyone whose land borders a body of water may use a
reasonable amount. Western states, where water is scarce, follow a prior appropriation rule, which
establishes water rights based on the first person to put it to beneficial use. See Joseph W. Dellapenna,
The Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 53 (2011).
311
SUTTON, supra note 287, at 174; see also id. at 17 (“In some settings, the challenge of imposing
a constitutional solution on the whole country at once will increase the likelihood that federal
constitutional law will be underenforced, that a ‘federalism discount’ will be applied to the right. State
courts face no such problem in construing their own constitutions.” (footnote omitted)); Goodwin Liu,
State Courts and Constitutional Structure, 128 YALE L.J. 1304, 1339 (2019) (reviewing SUTTON, supra
note 287) (“[S]ome constitutional issues are inherently complex and, as a practical matter, might be best
resolved on a state-by-state basis rather than through one-size-fits-all adjudication for the entire nation.”).
312
SUTTON, supra note 287, at 175. Judge Sutton parallels James Madison’s insight in Federalist
No. 51 that dividing power “between two distinct governments,” in addition to dividing power within
each government, is vital to securing our basic rights and liberties. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Liu, supra note 311, at 1308 (declaring Judge Sutton “a
true believer in Madison’s insight” in Federalist No. 51).
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especially true. For example, states that have a history of particularly
egregious discrimination or police misconduct may want to have lower
discovery standards than others.
In sum, our dual constitutional system empowers states to
independently determine the rights guaranteed by their constitutions. Such
independent, state-specific interpretation is preferable to states lockstepping
with the Supreme Court’s interpretations. In the selective law enforcement
context, states are not bound by federal precedent because the Court has not
mandated that the Armstrong standard be applied. Accordingly, state courts
should interpret their state constitutions to authorize a less demanding
discovery standard for selective law enforcement claims.
IV. A NEW DISCOVERY STANDARD ON THE STATE LEVEL
Armstrong’s standard is not workable in the selective law enforcement
context. Yet, as long as state courts continue to employ the insuperable
Armstrong standard, defendants challenging race discrimination by the
police will be denied discovery, and both state and federal equal protection
guarantees will go unfulfilled.
Rather than waiting for the discovery standard to evolve through the
uncertain and slow common law process, states can proactively change the
standard through one of the avenues of reform discussed above—state court
rules, state statutes, or state constitutional provisions. Of these, state court
rules are the most promising. Just as the Washington Supreme Court created
a standard for race discrimination in jury selection that was easier to meet
than Batson, state courts should adopt a lower discovery standard in the
selective law enforcement context.
This Part proposes a state court rule to facilitate discovery in support of
racially selective law enforcement claims. Section IV.A describes the
proposed rule (the Rule), which seeks to provide a clear and objective
standard that can be applied consistently by state courts. Our Rule preserves
the spirit of Armstrong by including a comparative standard but follows
Washington and Sellers by eliminating Armstrong’s granular similarly
situated requirement. Finally, Section IV.B responds to potential criticisms
of the Rule.
A. The Proposed Rule
A new state court rule is preferable to either a state statute or a court
decision reinterpreting a state constitutional provision. Such a rule would
enable defendants to investigate race discrimination while avoiding
legislative gridlock, the vagaries of litigation, and lockstepping.
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Legislatures, by design, are slow-moving creatures. Much pressure
must be brought to bear and consensus reached for any progress to be made,
especially in the criminal justice arena. Texas’s Michael Morton Act, for
example, was the result of a series of exonerations that “shook the public’s
trust in the Texas criminal justice system,” as well as an extensive advocacy
effort by Texas Appleseed and the Texas Defender Service.313 Thus, state
statutes are not an ideal mechanism for the type of reform needed in the
selective law enforcement arena.
Litigation that asks a state court to reinterpret its state constitution is
also less tangible than it would seem. First, reformers would need to find the
right case—one with sufficient evidence of discrimination, and with data that
are accessible before discovery to enable the defendant to develop the record.
Second, the court would have to swim against the tide of lockstepping.
Finally, a state supreme court would be unlikely to hear a selective law
enforcement discovery case if it is already settled law that Armstrong applies.
Thus, litigation is also a less viable avenue of reform.
A state supreme court rule akin to Washington’s Rule 37 is therefore
the best way to enable defendants to obtain discovery regarding race
discrimination by the police. Such a rule should draw on the framework
outlined in the recent federal court of appeals cases.
The first section of our proposed Rule addresses its purpose. The
remainder of the Rule articulates the discovery standard.
1. Text
(a) Purpose. The purpose of this rule is to set the standard for granting
discovery in support of a racially selective law enforcement claim
brought by a criminal defendant. A racially selective law enforcement
claim is a challenge that a particular law enforcement agency or its
constituent agents violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or the equal
protection provision of the [name of state] constitution.
(b) Required Evidentiary Showing. To obtain discovery, a defendant shall
present evidence sufficient to create a reasonable inference of either
discriminatory effect or discriminatory intent. A defendant need not
present evidence of both discriminatory effect and discriminatory
intent.

313
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Discriminatory Effect Showing Sufficient to Obtain Discovery. A
defendant is entitled to discovery if the defendant presents
evidence sufficient to create a reasonable inference that there is
a disparity between (i) the racial composition of the “selected
group” and (ii) the racial composition of the “benchmark
group.”
(A) Selected Group. The selected group is the defendant and the
universe of individuals selected by law enforcement officers
for arrest or citation.
(B) Benchmark Group. The benchmark group is the general
population of the relevant geographic area reflected in
publicly available census data.
(C) Relevant Geographic Area. The relevant geographic area is
the geographic area policed by the law enforcement agency
that arrested or cited the defendant.
(D) Racial Composition. In determining the racial composition
of the selected group and the benchmark group, respectively,
a defendant may aggregate all people of color (nonwhites) or
provide a more detailed racial breakdown.
(E) Similarly Situated Showing Not Required to Establish
Discriminatory Effect. To obtain discovery under this
section, a defendant is not required to present any evidence
that there existed similarly situated individuals of a different
race who were not selected by law enforcement officers for
arrest or citation, or to present any comparison beyond the
general population of the relevant geographic area.

(2)

Discriminatory Intent Showing Sufficient to Obtain Discovery. A
defendant is entitled to discovery if the defendant presents
evidence sufficient to create a reasonable inference that the law
enforcement agency or its agents acted with discriminatory
intent.

2. Rationale
The Rule’s required evidentiary showing charts a middle ground
between Washington and Sellers on one hand and Armstrong on the other.
Recall that Armstrong requires a threshold showing of “some evidence” of
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. 314 In addition, for
314

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465–66 (1996).

1043

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

discriminatory effect, Armstrong requires a defendant to make an impossibly
granular similarly situated comparison only ever met at the merits stage in
Yick Wo and rarely met at the discovery stage.315 Washington and Sellers,
however, set a much lower bar for both prongs, removing the similarly
situated element of the discriminatory-effect prong and holding that a
defendant need not prove discriminatory intent.316
Under the Rule’s section (b), a defendant is entitled to discovery if the
defendant presents evidence sufficient to create a reasonable inference of
either discriminatory effect or discriminatory intent. The Rule departs from
Armstrong in that proof of both prongs is not required. The Rule tracks and
clarifies Armstrong’s “some evidence” standard by requiring “evidence
sufficient to create a reasonable inference.”317
The Rule’s discriminatory-effect section, section (b)(1), maintains a
requirement that the defendant present evidence of a racial disparity.
However, like Washington and Sellers, section (b)(1)(E) of the Rule
eliminates the impossible “similarly situated” requirement, avoiding
Armstrong’s catch-22. The Rule proposes a clearer discriminatory-effect
standard than Washington and Sellers. Section (b)(1) expressly requires the
defendant to present a straightforward comparison “sufficient to create a
reasonable inference that there is a disparity” between two groups, the
“selected group” and the “benchmark group.” In addition, section (b)(1)(D)
enables the defendant to aggregate people of color (nonwhites), rather than
requiring a more fine-grained analysis. For example, if the selected group is
40% Black and 50% Hispanic, that group is composed of 90% people of
color for purposes of the Rule’s comparative standard.
Sections (b)(1)(A)–(B) lay out the definitions for the “selected group”
and the “benchmark group.” The “selected group” comprises “the defendant
and the universe of individuals selected by law enforcement officers for
arrest or citation.” 318 The “benchmark group” is defined as “the general
population of the relevant geographic area reflected in publicly available

315
Id. (first citing Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1905); and then citing Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886)); see also supra notes 94, 96 and accompanying text.
316
See supra notes 148–158 and accompanying text.
317
517 U.S. at 468–69.
318
Notably, without discovery, it is difficult to ascertain the contours of the selected group, let alone
the race of each person in the selected group. Recall that information about the selected group was some
of the very evidence the Armstrong defendants sought in discovery. See supra text accompanying note
63. The defense may be able to search the court’s electronic docketing system to learn the names of other
people law enforcement have selected for the same operation, sting, or offense, but that system typically
does not provide race information. The best way to determine the selected group is therefore to contact
the public defender’s office and the private bar and gather names, case numbers, and race from every
single lawyer who represents a client targeted in the particular operation.
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census data.” Section (b)(1)(C) defines the “relevant geographic area” as the
“geographic area policed by the law enforcement agency that arrested or
cited the defendant.” If a law enforcement agency were intentionally
targeting predominately Black or Hispanic neighborhoods, drawing the
benchmark group from the particular geographic area where the agency ran
the operation would mask discrimination. Accordingly, the Rule defines the
benchmark group more broadly, as all of the people available to be selected
for arrest by that agency.
The closely analogous employment discrimination context supports this
conception of the two groups. In the Title VII context, the statistical question
is “how many African-Americans should have been hired based on the
relevant labor market?”319 In a failure-to-hire case, the selected group is the
universe of nonwhite applicants who were not hired and the benchmark group
is the relevant labor pool.320 In the selective law enforcement context, the
question is how many people of color should have been selected (aka
“hired”) by the law enforcement agency based on the available pool of
people (the benchmark group).
Using the general population reflected in census data as the benchmark
group is justified by the practical realities of a criminal case in which the
defendant has not yet obtained discovery and therefore does not know the
law enforcement agency’s selection criteria. Without any information about
the law enforcement agency’s selection criteria, it is difficult for a defendant
to identify a more specific benchmark group than the general population.
Using the general population as the benchmark group is the only way to
avoid backing defendants into yet another catch-22. As the defendants in
Davis observed: “The government cannot refuse to disclose its targeting
criteria and, simultaneously, criticize defendants for using a comparison
group that does not incorporate those secret criteria.”321 Even if the defendant
knows that the agency’s selection criteria include, for example, people with
certain criminal histories, it is extremely difficult to determine the universe
of people with prior convictions for a particular offense.322 And even if that
universe of people is identifiable, race data are rarely publicly available.323
319

E.E.O.C. v. O & G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co., 38 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1994).
Of course, under Title VII, this question arises at the merits stage. A civil plaintiff is automatically
entitled to discovery that enables the plaintiff to define the parameters of the selected group and the
benchmark group. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
321
Defendants-Appellees’ Brief, supra note 135, at 30.
322
See Starr, supra note 214, at 492 (“[I]t is very hard for litigants to prove racial profiling. . . . In
federal criminal cases, just getting discovery is notoriously difficult.”).
323
See, e.g., Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 643 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the Illinois
State Police’s citations database “does not record the race of the motorist,” a lacuna that proved fatal to
320
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In the Chicago stash house litigation that Professor Siegler led in the district
court, for example, it took nine months, hundreds of pages of motions, and a
related civil subpoena enforcement action to obtain the kind of racially coded
criminal history data needed to construct a benchmark group.324
The Rule’s use of the general population as the benchmark group is also
supported by analogizing to employment discrimination law, where “[t]he
relevant geographic area should be the geographic area from which
applicants would have come, absent any discrimination.” 325 In the
employment discrimination context, this means the “immediate locality,
either the city in which the employer is located, or the surrounding Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area.”326 There, the benchmark group is defined as
the general population when the job skill involved is one that many people
have or can fairly or readily acquire. 327 In the selective law enforcement
context, the general population within the law enforcement agency’s purview
is likewise the appropriate benchmark group because every member of that
population is equally “qualified” to commit a crime. 328 As Judge Nguyen
explained in Sellers, “There is no reason to suspect that persons of a
particular race are more likely to agree to commit a stash house robbery
unless one believes that persons of that race are inherently more prone to

the plaintiffs’ claim: “Without comparative racial information, plaintiffs can not prove that they were
stopped, detained, or searched, when similarly situated whites were not”); Report of Dr. Jeffrey Fagan,
Ph.D., supra note 9, at 7 (“Both sources of criminal history information provided for this litigation have
limited or no information on the Hispanic ethnicity either of the defendants or the [benchmark]
population.”). As Professor Sonja Starr remarks:
Often . . . the limits of available data will mean that it is just not possible to determine whether
the police are discriminating based on race. These research challenges are also problems for
courts, litigants challenging such discrimination, and police departments themselves as they seek
to comply with their constitutional obligations.
Starr, supra note 214, at 487.
324
See supra notes 219–220 and accompanying text.
325
RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & JASON R. BENT, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION § 4.4 (2019).
326
2 JOHN F. BUCKLEY IV & MICHAEL R. LINDSAY, DEFENSE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS
§ 20:9 (2020); see also E.E.O.C. v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 303 (7th Cir. 1991)
(“Because of this flaw, and because the comparison was not restricted to black entry-level workers, we
believe that the court erred in accepting these comparisons based upon ‘relevant labor markets’ smaller
than Chicago.”).
327
See 8 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES § 107:122 (2020) (first citing
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977); and then citing E.E.O.C. v. Rath
Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 336 (8th Cir. 1986)).
328
This is especially true when the prosecution refuses to disclose the law enforcement agency’s
selection criteria, making it difficult to identify a narrower benchmark group than the general population.

1046

115:987 (2021)

Discovering Racial Discrimination by the Police

committing violent crime for profit—a dangerously racist view that has no
place in the law.”329
Unlike United States v. Lopez,330 section (b)(1) of the Rule does not
require that the racial disparity between the selected group and the
benchmark group be statistically significant. It is true that in the Title VII
context, the Supreme Court has held that “a prima facie case of disparateimpact liability” is essentially “a threshold showing of a significant statistical
disparity, and nothing more.”331 This standard, however, applies at the merits
stage, after the plaintiff has gained discovery under the broad civil standard.
Statistical significance is an unreasonable gatekeeper at the discovery
stage of a criminal case. Traditionally, courts require statistical significance
at the 5% level (a p-value of 0.05 or less), the standard for publishing an
empirical study in a peer-reviewed scientific journal.332 In the selective law
enforcement context, the p-value represents the probability that the level of
racial disparity observed in the defendant’s data would appear by random
chance alone—that is, if race played no role in law enforcement’s
decisions. 333 Although courts employ this demanding standard in other
contexts, statistical significance at any level has no place in a discovery
standard that applies before the defendant has received any data. 334
Defendants seeking discovery about discrimination should not have to
establish discrimination with the degree of confidence required for statistical
significance.
Requiring a defendant who has not obtained any discovery to meet the
same standard as an academic seeking to publish a study in a peer-reviewed
329

United States v. Sellers, 906 F.3d 848, 860 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nguyen, J., concurring).
See supra notes 168–170 and accompanying text.
331
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (citation omitted).
332
Jonah B. Gelbach, Estimation Evidence, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 553 (2020) (“[C]ourts frequently
focus on conventional hypothesis testing . . . at the significance level of 5%, because that is the approach
many statistics-using scholars take in their scholarly activities.”).
333
David H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1337–39
(1986) (“[A] significance test determines whether an observed result is so unlikely to have occurred by
chance alone that it is reasonable to attribute the result to something else.”); David H. Kaye & David A.
Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211, 250 (3d
ed. 2011) (“The p-value is the probability of getting data as extreme as, or more extreme than, the actual
data—given that the null hypothesis is true.”).
334
Empirical evidence in the civil context suggests that “using conventional hypothesis testing with
the most common significance level, 5%, is tantamount to requiring the plaintiff to present evidence
powerful enough to convince the plaintiff’s most favorable juror that there is at least a 79% chance the
plaintiff’s litigation position is correct.” Gelbach, supra note 332, at 581; see also Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1511 (1999) (“The five percent
convention is rooted in considerations that have no direct relevance to litigation, such as the need to ration
pages in scientific journals.”).
330
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journal will lead to the same result as Armstrong—it will block potentially
meritorious claims.335 Such a high standard raises a serious risk that courts
will incorrectly assume that no discrimination exists when discrimination is,
in fact, afoot. Courts instead should look to whether the defendant has
created a reasonable inference that a disparity exists. If a defendant can show
that the police are targeting people of color at a rate greater than their
representation in the general population, judges should grant discovery.
Additionally, requiring statistical significance is impractical at the
discovery stage of a criminal case. To establish a statistically significant
disparity, a defendant would have to hire an expensive expert to produce a
report. But many criminal defendants are indigent and would have to petition
the court to appoint an expert.336 If the defendant succeeded in obtaining an
expert, the government would also hire an expensive expert to produce a
report contending that the defendant had not shown a statistically significant
disparity. And all of this would occur before the defendant had obtained any
discovery.
Section (b)(1)(E) further tracks Davis, Washington, and Sellers by not
requiring the defendant to identify either a granular similarly situated
benchmark group or particular similarly situated individuals—that is,
specific people—who were not targeted by law enforcement.337 This choice
recognizes that Armstrong’s similarly situated requirement is neither
appropriate nor feasible at the discovery stage of a selective law enforcement
claim; it is simply impossible for a defendant to point to a particular person
whom law enforcement chose not to arrest. Professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann
levies a more structural critique of the similarly situated prong, explaining
that even “[i]n the face of overwhelming disparate racial impact, litigants are
still expected to show that the effect of race and race alone can be isolated
335
Requiring statistical significance thus risks what are known as Type II errors—“finding no
relationship when one does exist”—in favor of avoiding Type I errors—“finding a relationship—for
example, between race and decision to prosecute [or arrest]—when none actually exists.” McAdams,
supra note 22, at 613 n.46. Given that discovery occurs at the fact-finding stage of the case, a forgiving
standard that risks Type I errors is preferable to a demanding standard that entirely prevents defendants
from uncovering race discrimination.
336
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (authorizing the appointment of experts in indigent criminal
cases); Jones v. Sterling, 110 P.3d 1271 (Ariz. 2005) (denying defendants’ motion for an expert in a
selective law enforcement case); McAdams, supra note 22, at 621 (“Defendants who are not wealthy
enough to produce their own survey cannot meet the similarly situated standard.”). In Professor Siegler’s
stash house litigation, for example, “the Court also granted Defendants’ motion for the appointment of a
top expert, Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, to conduct a statistical analysis of the stash house cases in this District to
determine whether there were statistically significant racial anomalies.” Order at 2, United States v.
Brown, No. 12-CR-0632-RC (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2017), ECF No. 581.
337
See supra Section II.B.2.
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from other factors to support a counterfactual causal account of
discrimination.” 338 Eliminating this requirement allows for a fairer
assessment of discriminatory effect.
Section (b)(2) of the Rule does not require a discriminatory-intent
showing at the discovery stage, in keeping with Washington and Sellers. The
Rule thus has the same effect as Washington’s Rule 37, which removed the
discriminatory-intent requirement in the jury-selection context and
substituted an “objective observer” test.339
Following Sellers, section (b)(2) nevertheless preserves the opportunity
for a defendant to present evidence “sufficient to create a reasonable
inference” of discriminatory intent in order to obtain discovery.
Although our Rule is silent on the type of evidence that can meet this
requirement, statistical evidence is relevant here, too. Despite the Supreme
Court’s holding in McCleskey v. Kemp that nonstatistical evidence is
required to demonstrate discriminatory intent, that case, like Armstrong,
arose in the selective prosecution context340 and has been interpreted to blunt
the force of statistical evidence in the selective law enforcement context.341
We agree with Professor Aziz Huq that statistical evidence can provide
evidence of discrimination, including discriminatory intent. 342 All of the
reasons for limiting Armstrong to the selective prosecution context apply
equally to McCleskey. In short, the Court’s prohibition on the use of statistics
to demonstrate discriminatory intent should not apply in the selective law
enforcement context.343

338

Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 165, at 1190–91. After discovery, at the merits stage, the similarly
situated standard is even more problematic because “it is not difficult for law enforcement to come
forward with plausible bases to distinguish potential targets as not ‘similarly situated,’ especially post hoc
and especially when there are highly unequal distributions between groups of variables that are plausibly
rational for law enforcement to consider, such as residence in high crime neighborhoods or criminal
history.” Id. at 1191 (discussing the Chicago stash house litigation).
339
See supra notes 252–254 and accompanying text.
340
481 U.S. 279, 289, 298–99 (1987) (holding that the “racially disproportionate impact” in the
administration of the death penalty in Georgia was not enough to overturn the defendant’s guilty verdict
absent a showing of “racially discriminatory purpose”).
341
See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (citing McCleskey,
481 U.S. at 298).
342
Huq, supra note 92, at 1283 (“[T]he judge tasked with investigating discriminatory intent should
embrace statistical findings for their modest, but important, role of evidentiary support[,] . . . [particularly
since] animus and statistical discrimination are often best flushed out using econometric tools.”).
343
See Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 996 n.14 (discussing this position). The authors will flesh out this
argument in a future paper.
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*

*

*

By requiring a comparison between the selected group and the
benchmark group, the Rule tracks the ultimate merits standard for selective
law enforcement and thus is still guided by the “spirit of Armstrong.”344 At
the same time, the Rule also recognizes a key real-world limitation—a more
granular comparison is impossible without discovery. As a result, the
comparative showing required by the Rule utilizes publicly available census
data and can be done without an expert. The Rule leaves any assessment of
the quantum of evidence needed to create a reasonable inference of
discriminatory effect to the discretion of the trial judge.
B. Response to Critiques
This Rule may generate some resistance. After all, state appellate courts
have traditionally applied Armstrong in the selective law enforcement
context.345
A comparison with Washington’s Rule 37 is instructive. In that context,
critics worried that an expanded Batson standard would open the floodgates
to meritless challenges.346 Of course, in the Batson context, some peremptory
strikes are driven by implicit—or even explicit—bias. If these challenges
have merit, opening the floodgates is a good thing because it curbs
discrimination. State and federal judges alike have expressed concern that
Batson’s high standard blocks meritorious claims, observing that it is
vanishingly rare for Batson challenges to be granted or upheld. 347 Many
scholars agree that the Batson standard is so high as to be virtually
unmeetable. 348 The ACLU’s contribution to the Washington Workgroup
344

United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 220 (3d Cir. 2017).
See supra Section III.A.
346
See Franklin L. Dacca, Individual Statement, in WORKGROUP FINAL REPORT, supra note 251, at
24, 25–26 (contending that the proposed standard would “create an unworkable voir dire process subject
to lengthy interruptions, delay, confusion and inappropriate scrutiny of individual jurors”).
347
See State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 335 (Wash. 2013) (plurality opinion) (“In over 40 cases
since Batson, Washington appellate courts have never reversed a conviction based on a trial court’s
erroneous denial of a Batson challenge.”), abrogated on other grounds by City of Seattle v. Erickson,
398 P.3d 1124 (Wash. 2017); People v. Gutierrez, 395 P.3d 186, 203 (Cal. 2017) (Liu, J., concurring)
(“Today’s decision is the first time in 16 years, and the second time in over 25 years, that this court has
found a Batson/Wheeler violation.”); Chamberlin v. Fisher, 885 F.3d 832, 846 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc)
(Costa, J., dissenting) (“[O]nly two of the hundreds of Batson decisions in our circuit have ever found
that a strike was discriminatory . . . .”).
348
See, e.g., Camille A. Nelson, Batson, O.J., and Snyder: Lessons from an Intersecting Trilogy,
93 IOWA L. REV. 1687, 1689 (2008) (arguing “Batson’s promise of protection against racially
345
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Report challenged the floodgates concern, arguing that it was necessary to
lower the burden for raising race-based objections to peremptory challenges
given that “the history of racial discrimination and need for strict regulation
are well-established.”349 The ACLU also pointed out the difficulty of proving
race discrimination under Batson. 350 A similar justification was given for
using the lower “objective observer” standard of proof for a New Jersey anticorruption law.351
The issue our Rule seeks to address—race discrimination by law
enforcement—is likewise well documented. 352 It is clear from the recent
wave of selective law enforcement challenges in federal stash house cases
that the Armstrong standard makes it extremely difficult for defendants to
obtain discovery, let alone prove such claims on the merits.353 Critics might
argue that the Rule overcorrects because laws are often enforced
disproportionately against people of color. As a result, the Rule’s standard
will almost always be met when a defendant is a person of color. However,
the Rule’s “reasonable inference” standard does not open the floodgates by
allowing discovery in every case because defendants must be targeted for a
particular crime or as part of a law enforcement operation that creates a
sufficiently large selected group. This limits the Rule’s application to only a
subset of cases. Finally, while the Rule relaxes the discovery standard, it does
not prevent a court from weeding out potentially meritless claims by
applying Armstrong’s demanding two-pronged standard at the merits stage
of a selective law enforcement challenge.
Another possible objection is that our proposed Rule would be outside
the power of a state court’s rulemaking authority. That authority is
commonly limited by either statutory or constitutional provisions. Like the

discriminatory jury selection has not been realized”); Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 248, at 1077 (“The
current [Batson] framework makes it exceedingly difficult for judges to reject even the most spurious of
peremptory strikes . . . .”); id. at 1092 (“Our analysis reveals that of 269 federal decisions between 2000
and 2009, the reviewing court granted a new trial in only eighteen cases—6.69% of the total.”).
349
ACLU of Wash., Wash. Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law., Fred T. Korematsu Ctr. for L. & Equal., Legal
Voice, Loren Miller Bar Ass’n & Latino/a Bar Ass’n of Wash., Statement, in WORKGROUP FINAL
REPORT, supra note 251, at 28, 28–29.
350
Id. at 29.
351
See In re Pontoriero, 106 A.3d 532, 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) (explaining that the
“risk of actual corruption,” which is notoriously difficult to prove, merited an objective observer
standard).
352
See supra note 105.
353
See supra Section II.B.
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federal Rules Enabling Act,354 many state statutes, constitutions, and cases
prohibit courts from changing substantive rights.355
The proposed Rule does not violate state courts’ rulemaking authority
because it does not create a new substantive discovery right for defendants.
Rather, it merely elaborates on the pathways for obtaining relevant evidence.
In the federal context, the Supreme Court has upheld the authority of district
courts to promulgate local rules unless they conflict with an Act of Congress
or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, they are constitutionally
unfounded, or the subject matter governed by the rule is not within the power
of the district court to regulate.356 States interpret the authority of their courts
to promulgate rules in the same way, as many state discovery provisions are
based on the federal rules.357 For example, a California court has explained
that “courts may institute only those local rules that are ‘not inconsistent with
law or with the rules adopted and prescribed by the Judicial Council.’” 358
The Rule we propose does not conflict with existing state court rules
because state rules regarding the scope of discovery in criminal cases set a

354
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (limiting federal courts’ ability to “prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure” to rules that do not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right”).
355
For examples of state statutes, see TENN. CODE § 16-3-403; TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.109; NEV.
REV. STAT. § 2.120.2; and WIS. STAT. § 751.12. For examples in state constitutions, see MO. CONST. art.
V, § 5; ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.111; and OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B). For examples of state court
decisions, see State v. Beam, 828 P.2d 891, 892 (Idaho 1992), which states that the Idaho Supreme
Court’s rulemaking power relates to procedural, not substantive matters. For a fifty-state survey of state
rules enabling acts, see Clark v. Austin, 101 S.W.2d 977, 996–1003 (Mo. 1937).
356
Whitehouse v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.R.I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1355 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Supreme
Court has upheld the authority of district courts to promulgate local rules unless 1) the rule conflicts with
an Act of Congress; 2) the rule conflicts with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; 3) the rule is
constitutionally infirm; or 4) the subject matter governed by the rule is not within the power of the district
court to regulate.” (first citing Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 654 (1986) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting);
then citing Miner v. Atlas, 363 U.S. 641, 651–52 (1960); and then citing Story v. Livingston, 38 U.S.
359, 368 (1839))).
357
See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1974 Amendment, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (“[Rule 16]
is intended to prescribe the minimum amount of discovery to which parties are entitled. It is not intended
to limit the judge’s discretion to order broader discovery . . . .”); State v. McIntosh, 58 P.3d 716, 724
(Kan. 2002) (explaining that the Kansas criminal discovery rule is “based on Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 16” and
“is not all-inclusive”); Green v. State, 835 S.E.2d 238, 243 n.10 (Ga. 2019) (observing that Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 16 “includes language materially similar to” Georgia’s criminal discovery statute);
State v. Peters, No. E2014-02322-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 6768615, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5,
2015) (“In determining whether the requested discovery is material, this Court has looked to federal
authority interpreting the analogous Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a).”).
358
In re Harley C., 249 Cal. Rptr. 3d 783, 788 (Ct. App. 2019) (quoting CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 68070(a)); see also, e.g., Trib. Rev. Publ’g Co. v. Thomas, 120 F. Supp. 362, 370 (W.D. Pa. 1954)
(describing a Pennsylvania statue authorizing state courts to establish rules so long as “such rules shall
not be inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of this commonwealth”).
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floor, not a ceiling, on how much discovery courts may order.359 Nor is there
much risk of a constitutional conflict. The Rule would only pose a potential
constitutional conflict when a state court has held that Armstrong’s discovery
standard applies to selective law enforcement claims. Most states have not
independently decided whether Armstrong applies to selective law
enforcement claims brought under their state constitution.360 The few states
that have applied Armstrong to the selective law enforcement context have
done so only in response to claims under the federal Equal Protection
Clause.361 In those states, there is no conflict so long as the Rule is limited to
the state constitution’s equal protection provision.
CONCLUSION
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”362 Yet, for too long,
Armstrong’s shadow has obscured any meaningful scrutiny of racial
discrimination by law enforcement officers. Although the police have
thousands of interactions with citizens each day, applying the Armstrong
standard allows their enforcement choices to go unchecked. There must be a
legal mechanism for criminal defendants to root out racial discrimination,
whether by federal agents who run fake stash house operations that
predominantly target people of color363 or police officers who stop drivers of
color at disproportionate rates.364 Without access to discovery, there is no
way to police the police in criminal cases.
Our legal system does not afford law enforcement officers the same
privileges as prosecutors, but that distinction has long gone unrecognized in
the doctrine. Three federal courts of appeals have now acknowledged this
distinction and have taken the important step of lowering the standard for
359

See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1974 Amendment, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; see also
Daniel S. McConkie, The Local Rules Revolution in Criminal Discovery, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 59, 114
(2017) (surveying the expansion of discovery obligations under local rules).
360
Only the Arizona Supreme Court has independently decided this question under its state’s
constitution. See supra notes 240–244 and accompanying text.
361
See supra notes 233–239 and accompanying text.
362
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 62 (Nat’l Home Libr. Found. 1933).
363
See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
364
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 105, at 267 (“[I]nterviews reveal that African-Americans strongly
believe that they are stopped and ticketed more often than whites, and the data from Ohio and elsewhere
show that they are right.”). One of the first successful selective law enforcement claims was brought in
State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 352 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996), where the court held that defendants
had established a prima facie case of selective enforcement of traffic laws. Soto, which was handed down
two months before Armstrong, had far-ranging effects within New Jersey. It led to a review of the law
enforcement practices of the New Jersey State Police, which led a New Jersey judge to conclude “that
defendants perceived to be African-American, Black or Hispanic are entitled to discovery [regarding
racial profiling] for motor vehicle stops that originated as a result of observations made by [New Jersey]
State Troopers.” State v. Lee, 920 A.2d 80, 82 (N.J. 2007).
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defendants seeking discovery in support of claims of racially selective law
enforcement. Other federal and state courts should follow suit. The Chicago
stash house litigation in Leslie Mayfield’s case and others demonstrates that
a lower discovery standard has an immense impact on criminal defendants
and advances the integrity of the legal system.
But federal courts alone will not bring us out of Armstrong’s shadow.
State courts see many more criminal cases than federal courts and have a role
in reform as well. Our innovative state court Rule would ensure that
defendants with meritorious claims can obtain the information they need to
shed light on discrimination by the police. The Rule would thus safeguard
the equal protection principles that undergird our system and strengthen our
commitment to racial justice.
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